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Abstract
THE DYNAMICS OF PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT:
A CASE STUDY IN URBAN MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES
by
John Kastan
Advisor: Professor William Kornblum 
This study describes the planning, development and 
implementation of the on-site school mental health program, 
an innovative mental health services program for 
schoolchildren in New York City. The program, developed 
jointly by the New York City Department of Mental Health, 
Mental Retardation, and Alcoholism Services and the New York 
City Board of Education in 1982, was fully implemented in 
1986. This study uses data gathered via the method of 
participant-observation (the author was employed by the 
Department of Mental Health), supplemented by the review of 
documents and discussions with key individuals.
The study begins by providing background on the two key 
organizations and their relations prior to the initiation of 
program planning. The study then goes on to describe six 
discrete stages of the program's development; these stages 
are punctuated by "decision points."
The first three stages of the program's development
reflect macro-implementation at the Citywide level. Micro­
implementation, which occurs in the individual school 
districts and schools, takes place in stages four, five and 
six (though macro-implementation does not completely end), 
as the program is established in seventy schools in nineteen 
community school districts.
Through this description and analysis of the six stages 
of program development, the study explores the political and 
organizational issues which affected the planning and 
implementation of the program.
The insider's view of the program also provides insight 
into the inner workings of public sector program 
development, illustrating the following: the inter- 
organizational and political problems raised by jointly 
developed programs; the ability of Budget agency officials 
to influence program development; and, the effectiveness of 
committed individuals within the educational and mental 
health services system to establish a program, however 
modified from its original conception.
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1I. INTRODUCTION
During the last two decades a great deal of attention has 
been focused, in New York City and other urban areas, on 
improving the quality of mental health services for 
children. Numerous reports of Federal, State and local 
commissions attest to this concern (Joint Commission, 1969; 
President's Commission, 1978; New York City Department of 
Mental Health, 1982; Knitzer, 1982; New York State Office of 
Mental Health, 1984). Along with recommendations to 
increase funding for programs for children have come demands 
that services for children be better organized, and that 
services which are provided under a variety of auspices be 
linked and coordinated. In particular, schools have been a 
focus of these recommendations, since nearly all children 
have some contact with schools. In response to 
recommendations for increased services, as well as for 
"service integration," (see Weiss, 1981 for a critical 
view), both public and voluntary non profit providers have 
responded.
NEED
The need for publicly supported and accessible mental 
health services for children and adolescents is particularly 
great in New York City, with its large concentration of poor 
and minority children. In 1982, the New York City 
Department of Mental Health (1982), using a conservative 
figure of 8% as a prevalence estimate for childhood mental 
health disorders, found that only 45,000 of an estimated 
141,000 children in need of services were receiving such 
services. And, Knitzer (1982), wrote that, nationwide, "of 
the three million seriously disturbed children in this 
country, two thirds are not getting the services they need. 
Countless others get inappropriate care" (ix). A more 
recent report by a Committee of the Institute of Medicine 
(1989) used a prevalence figure of 12%, and emphasized that 
"childhood mental disorders are serious, persistent, and 
lead to suffering for the children and their families.
Mental illness in childhood is also costly and a burden to 
society, which must care for children and deal with the 
results of their difficulties in school and other social 
systems" (33).
Delivering mental health services is often as much an 
organizational problem as a clinical problem. One of the 
virtues of addressing the need for services for children 
through school-based interventions is that the children are 
already in school; therefore, teachers and other school 
personnel can observe the children on an ongoing basis.
Their behavioral impressions, coupled with information on 
school performance (while not providing a psychiatric 
diagnosis) can be useful in identifying that a problem may 
exist (Kriechman: 1985). Based upon this information, a 
referral to a mental health professional can lead to the 
assessment of a particular problem or set of problems, which 
may lead to the formulation of a diagnosis and treatment 
plan. Often, emotional problems are linked to physical 
health problems. Emotional problems also are frequently 
exacerbated by poor housing, poverty, chaotic family 
situations or other stress factors. And educational 
problems of the sort that lead to special education 
placement may coexist with emotional difficulties, such as 
conduct disorders.
According to information provided in an evaluation 
report of the program I will be discussing, the sorts of 
behaviors exhibited by the children who received treatment 
in the program included physical aggression and verbal 
acting out, destructiveness toward property, lack of effort 
in the classroom, display of poor self-image, and extreme 
sadness. Depending on the intensity, severity, and etiology 
of these behaviors, they can be associated with serious 
emotional disorders (Garfinkel, Carlson, and Weller: 1990: 
passim).
A SOCIOLOGICAL CASE STUDY OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL
COORDINATION
4This study describes the planning, development and 
implementation of a mental health program for schoolchildren 
in New York City, the "on-site school mental health 
program." The program is the result of collaboration between 
the New York City Board of Education ("Public Schools") and 
the New York City Department of Mental Health, Mental 
Retardation and Alcoholism Services ("Mental Hygiene 
Department"). The program, which is currently operating in 
approximately 70 schools in 19 school districts throughout 
New York City, involves the delivery of mental health 
services to school children in public school buildings by 
the staff of voluntary non-profit mental health agencies and 
voluntary and municipal hospitals which are under contract 
with the New York City Department of Mental Health, Mental 
Retardation and Alcoholism Services.
Because this program was developed jointly by two 
municipal agencies, coordination and cooperation were 
significant concerns, both during the planning of the 
program and during its implementation in the schools.
Studies of urban decision-making and program development 
have explored and demonstrated the difficulty of getting 
things done within just one organization (Yin and Yates, 
1975; Yin, 1979; Nelson and Yates, 1978; Bardach, 1977); 
when two or more organizations are involved, the difficulty 
can increase significantly (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973).
When one organization tries to collaborate with another, the 
standard operating procedures, vocabularies, and 
institutionalized patterns of each organization, normally 
taken for granted by those within the respective 
organization, are thrown into relief and often called into 
question. Novel problems arise which require novel 
responses. Also, each organization has a different stake in 
the program; what may be a high priority for one 
organization may be less significant for another. And, 
because, organizations are not similarly structured, the 
units in each organization which have responsibility for the 
program may not be equivalent. Thus, relative power, 
authority, resources and responsibility may differ. All of 
these factors can influence the course of program 
development and implementation, affecting both the program's 
ultimate design as well as its chances for success.
This study is concerned with how the innovative on-site 
school mental health program came to be, how it changed as 
the result of the respective goals and input of members of 
different organizations, and how its implementation occurred 
within a complex multi-organizational environment. (Table l 
provides a graphic portrayal of the organizations involved.) 
In addition, I intend to render an in-depth portrait of the 
interplay of the political, organizational, and professional
TABLE 1
ORGANIZATIONAL FIELD
STATE
Cl TV-POLICY
Education Dept.
B oard of Education
Cl TV-OP E RA T IN G
BORuUGH/REGION
BIS T RICT/CO MMU NIT V
public school
system
district
Legislature
City Council/Board 
of Estimate ADUOCATES
union
Mayor's Office
Mental Hygiene Dept
Borough
special educ. mgmt. Uftice
Mental health 
agencies/ hospital:
Budget Office
SCHOOL/NEIGH BO RH 0 0 D SCliOO 1: on-site teams
7forces which occurred during the planning and implementation 
of the program. This will be done by discussing and 
analyzing six stages in the program's evolution, all of 
which are marked by major decision points (Pressman and 
Wildavsky, 1973). These decision points are defined as "each 
time an act of agreement has to be registered for (the) 
program to continue" (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973: xiv). 
While the term "decision point" does not suggest it, this 
registering of agreement can be rather protracted, and the 
course is not necessarily a linear one with predictable 
movement from disagreement to agreement between parties 
(Berman, 1978: 167). Rather, unpredictable "urban decision 
games" and "game playing" (Yates, 1977:142) are more likely. 
Further, "... urban games are highly unstable because 
different players, issues, and problems combine in an 
unpredictable way to produce a barrage of demands that urban 
policy makers must constantly react to. ... I suggest that 
the players in urban decisions do not follow established, 
stable rules and rituals..."(144). Table 2 displays the 
major participants arrayed by stage and organizational 
level.
It should be noted that the decisions themselves are 
not the sole focus of the study; in fact, they function more 
as punctuation, than as nouns and verbs. Rather, it is the 
"action" or "process," and the social context within which 
they occur, which is of primary significance (Harmon, 1989).
8Key: MHD=Mental Hygiene Department
PS= Public Schools (Central offices)
SOMH=State Office of Mental Health 
OMB=Budget Office 
UFT=United Federation of Teachers 
MHD BO=Mental Hygiene Department Borough Offices 
DAS/SE=Deputy Assistant Superintendents for Special Education 
MH agencies=Free-standing community mental health agencii 
hospitals 
COH=Committee on the Handicapped 
SBST=School Based Support Teams
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This is consistent with Hannon (1989) who writes that 
"decisions are not objectively real but are objectifications 
of the ongoing flow of social process. Informally, 
decisions may be thought of as "stopped processes" (p. 146).
In addition to organizing the study by using stages and 
decision points, I have borrowed and adapted Berman's (1978) 
distinction between micro and macro implementation. He uses 
this distinction to develop a framework for studying how 
federal policies —  and the programs developed from these 
policies —  were put into action at the local level. Macro­
implementation is the execution of policies (often, but not 
exclusively developed at the federal level) "to influence 
local delivery organizations to behave in desired ways"
(164). Micro-implementation is the response of local 
organizations, as reflected in their carrying out of these 
policies (164). Berman says that "essential differences 
between the processes of micro-implementation and macro­
implementation arise from their distinct institutional 
settings. Whereas the institutional setting for micro­
implementation is a local delivery organization, the 
institutional setting for macro-implementation is an entire 
policy sector..." (164). Berman does not define 
"institutional setting" precisely, indicating that it may 
range from "a formal organization ... or part of one" to 
"the complex set of interrelated organizations and actors 
that make up a national policy sector" (162). The important
10
thing is that "a policy's implementation problem derives not 
only from its design? it derives from the policy's 
relationship to its institutional setting" (159).
The impetus for this program came in 1981 from City and 
State mental health officials, and from the public school 
administration. All were dissatisfied with the way the 
public schools were providing mental health services to 
school children, and were cognizant of the need for 
additional services for children and adolescents. At that 
time, both the State and City mental health departments were 
providing funds to the Public Schools; these funds were 
provided in order to enable school personnel to refer some 
children with a need for mental health services to community 
mental health agencies, while other children would be served 
by clinical staff employed by the Public Schools. However, 
a study carried out in 1982 by the Public Schools and the 
Mental Hygiene Department revealed that, in fact, few 
children were being referred by school personnel to 
community mental health agencies.
In addition, the school system was faced with the 
problem of providing legally mandated special education 
services to a growing number of school children, and there 
was great pressure from the City's Budget Office to keep the 
cost of these services down. And, also, in 1982, a new 
schools chancellor, Frank Macchiarola, expressed his 
openness to the idea of outside agencies coming into the
11
schools to provide mental health services to children who 
were not necessarily enrolled in special education. While 
this had been suggested by the Mental Hygiene Department in 
the past, it had never been well-received, largely because 
the teacher's union, which also represented school social 
workers and school psychologists, had always voiced its 
opposition to such a proposal.
Therefore, in 1982, the two agencies began to plan a 
more effective program, one that would involve community 
mental health agencies more actively with school personnel. 
Two things were clear from the outset: a program had to be 
designed whose policies and procedures were compatible with 
the routines of two large, complex, and heavily regulated 
bureaucratic systems —  the Public Schools and the Mental 
Hygiene Department —  and, when this was not possible, that 
one or the other, or both, had to be willing to accept a 
change. Changes from standard operating procedure for 
either of the two organizations, however, often required 
legal or administrative approval. In addition, sometimes 
the approval for such changes also had to come from outside 
parties who often wished to maintain the status quo. Even 
relatively minor matters might require protracted 
discussion, negotiations, and justifications.
An initial proposal for the program, prepared jointly 
by staff of the two agencies, was completed in February 
1983. Then discussions continued which resulted in a
12
revised proposal in September 1983. The proposal described 
a plan to establish mental health clinics in selected 
schools which would be operated by community mental health 
agencies in contract with the Mental Hygiene Department. 
Teachers and other school personnel would be expected to 
make referrals to the clinics of children who appeared to 
need mental health treatment.
Since the proposal involved resources being shifted 
from one municipal agency to another (the funds available 
for the program were at the time being expended to fund 
staff within the Public Schools who assessed children for 
special education placement), the City's Office of 
Management and Budget (Budget Office) had to approve the 
plan. The Budget Office reviewed the proposal and expressed 
its concern that any such plan provide a cost-effective 
alternative to special education services. Thus, it 
requested modifications to the proposal.
It was not until February 1984 that implementation of 
the program could begin, after the proposal was modified to 
gain approval from the Budget Office. Further, even after 
agreement on program design, policies, and procedures had 
been reached by central office personnel, individual school 
district officials had the authority to refuse the program 
as well as to impose their own modifications.
In spite of these obstacles a program was eventually 
established, the implementation took a great deal of time
and required the efforts of many deeply committed 
individuals. While implementation could begin once the 
Budget Office gave its approval in February 1984, the 
modifications requested by the Budget Office resulted in the 
Public School and Mental Hygiene Department staff having to 
reformulate many aspects of the program. The Budget Office 
wanted the program to serve as an alternative to special 
education placement or to serve as a way out of special 
education for children who could be decertified from special 
education. The Budget Office also demanded that an 
evaluation of the program be carried out to determine if the 
program was reducing special education referrals. The 
original conception of the program had been to provide 
mental health services to all children who might require 
them, without any categorical requirements. While such a 
program would have been difficult enough to implement and 
would have encountered opposition from the teachers union, 
one geared specifically as an alternative to special 
education was more complex and more likely to create 
friction in the schools.
The first steps to implementing the program were to 
identify the schools and mental health agencies which would 
participate. In the Spring of 1984 an initial group of five 
school districts were identified for implementation, in what 
became known as Phase One. Three or four schools in each 
district were chosen, with the hope that the program could
be started by the end of the school year. Meanwhile, mental 
health agencies were being identified to provide services in 
these districts. Simultaneously, fourteen more districts, 
Phase Two, were being identified for subsequent 
implementation, as were corresponding community mental 
health agencies. At the same time, the staff of the 
Public Schools and the Mental Hygiene Department were 
developing policies and procedures for the program's 
operation. These often had to be revised based upon 
feedback from the school district officials who were 
approached about the program.
It took almost two years for the program to be fully 
established. Each step of the way, in each school district 
and each individual school, there were administrative 
obstacles to be overcome, relationships between school and 
agency staff to be built, and procedures to be refined.
Space had to be located for the program to operate. The 
search for space began anew each September in many of the 
schools. Also, teachers had to be reoriented to the program 
each year and caseloads had to be built up, since the 
turnover of both teachers and students in the schools is 
quite high.
However, in part due to persistence and commitment, the 
program was sustained, and was viewed by many observers as a 
success. For several years the Commissioner of Mental 
Health had to fight to keep the program in the budget,
15
since, at first the evaluation was delayed, and then its 
results were inconclusive, which led the Budget Office to 
challenge the program's continuation. But the program had 
its supporters, both in the education and mental health 
advocacy and provider communities, and thus its future 
became more secure.
ISSUES IN PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT
This study examines the development of the on-site 
school mental health program by looking at the different 
players and influences involved in its planning and 
implementation. I have identified six stages in the 
program's development during which various organizations had 
to reach agreements for continued development, and I have 
separated and marked these stages by "decision points," as 
follows:
Stage 1: Recognizing the Need for a New Approach 
Decision Point 1: The Public Schools and Mental Hygiene
Department Agree to Design a New Program 
Stage 2: Planning a New Approach to School Mental Health 
Services
Decision Point 2: The Public Schools and Mental
Hygiene Department Agree on a Program 
Design
Stage 3: Fiscal Constraints on Implementing A New Approach
to School Mental Health Services 
Decision Point 3: The City's Budget Office agrees to the
Program
Stage 4: Obstacles to Implementation: Competing Interests
and Issues
Decision Point 4: Concerns Raised by The Teacher's Union are
Successfully Addressed 
Stage 5: Selling the Program to School District 
Superintendents
Decision Point 5: School District Superintendents Accept the
Program
Stage 6: Micro-Implementation
The successful movement from each stage to the next was 
a protracted process, often resulting in program design 
adjustment or modification (Table 3 is a timeline of the 
program's development). Through the description and 
analysis of these events and processes, this study will 
provide insight into the decision-making process of the 
on-site school mental health program, in particular, as well 
as insight into urban decision-making processes, in general.
Two processes or phenomena stand out. One, which I 
refer to as the fiscalization of social policy, is reflected 
in the Budget Office staff's ability to reshape the program, 
based upon its own fiscal priorities. The other is the 
ability of individuals within the agencies, in spite of the
17
TABLE 3
TIMELINE OF PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION
HAC80-IKPLEHEHTATI0H
STAGE 1 STAGE 2 STAGE 3 STAGE 4
198C
1
September 1932 October 1582 Marci 1914
BOE Surest: of BOE and DMH staff Budget Office Selection of
i Child Guidance begin tc develop reviews proposal agencies and
restructured into proposal for a and requests school districts
SBSTS program of mental modifications; so begins;
health services in begins a protracted Guidelines for
the schools series of meetings program operation
and proposal drafted for
revisions; Budget review;
office wants Meetings with
program to reduce Phase one school
'i special education districts and
i| referrals agencies in
l| preparation for.1 program start-up
in current school
year
BOE and DHH begin BOE and DHH review Budget office and 1984
effort to increase previous year's School officials Meeting of
referrals Iron effort tc encourage alsc meeting about advisory group
schools to referrals from special education including central
community mental schools to budget Office and
health agencies community agencies district school
and are officials;
disappointed concerns about
program heard from
union officials
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1981
State Office of 
Mental Health 
refuses tc provide 
State fiscal aid 
until BOE improves 
accountability for 
mental health 
funds supporting 
SBSTS
February 1983
First proposal 
presented for 
review by agencies' 
leadership
DHH carries out 
study of 
emotionally 
disturbed children 
in existing child 
mental health 
program to 
demonstrate 
similarity with 
special education 
population
April 1984
Decision Point 4: 
Union officials 
drop opposition to 
program in 
exchange for 
greater input into 
district 
selections; 
presence of union 
at organizational 
meetings; liaison 
with SBST to be 
included in 
program design
City Council 
President Bellamy 
issues report 
critical of both 
Schools and DMH in 
regard to mental 
health services 
for children
i
i
1
April 1983
School Chancellor 
Maccniarcia resigns
February 1984
Budget office 
agrees to revised 
proposal and 
requires an 
evaluation of 
program for 
continued funding 
past 1964-85 school 
year
1
| April 1982
Decision Point 1: 
Schools Chancellor 
and Mental Health 
Ccsiiissioner agree 
in principle to 
establish mental 
health services in 
schools
Work continues to 
revise proposal; 
community mental 
health agencies 
would establish 
clinics in schools 
and schools would 
assign school 
liaisons to work to 
encourage referrals
September 1983
Decision Point 2: 
Proposal sent to 
Budget Office for 
review and approval 
to move funds from 
Schools tc Mental 
Health Budget
TABLE 3 
(cont.)
MICRO-IMPLEMENTATION
STAGES 5 & 6 
  _  -  -  ..
March 1984
Meetings in each school district 
begin; negotiations with 
specific mental health agencies, 
as well. Policies and 
procedures presented to local 
school personnel; modifications 
made,
June 1984
Phase One programs (five school 
districts) established. Space 
is found, in some cases, after 
delays. Issues such as 
telephone installation, security 
arrangements, etc. begin to 
addressed. Some referrals for 
summer programs.
September 1984 
Beginning of school year 
provides opportunity for 
initiation of formal referral 
systems in Phase One districts; 
Phase Two programs begin to 
become established.
September 1985 
After long delay, formal 
evaluation of program commences. 
Data collected both through 
agency databases and through 
questionnaires and interviews 
with teachers, guidance 
counselors, mental health 
workers, and others.
January 1986
Decision Point 5:
Programs established in all 
nineteen districts and two high 
schools
November 1986 
Draft of evaluation report 
completed. After review by City 
agency staff, changes made. 
Results inconclusive on question 
of impact on special education 
rates.
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obstacles and organizational inertia, to persevere and 
establish the program, however compromised the final plan 
was from the original programmatic conception. And, in 
fact, at the level of micro-implementation within the 
schools, the program almost certainly was able to help many 
of the same children it had been initially intended for.
This study is also intended to contribute to a greater 
understanding of the functioning of urban educational and 
mental health services organizations. In addition, since 
this study will show how public policy development, 
planning, and implementation are "inevitably conjoined" 
(Yates, 1977:xiii), it can also serve as a guide to those 
who intend to develop and implement programs designed to 
provide services to children, especially to those designing 
programs requiring the involvement of more than one 
organization.
Because organizational prerogatives may come into 
conflict, organizations can be especially resistant to 
program changes that are proposed by other organizations or 
require involvement with other organizations (Miller, 1958; 
Gray, 1985). Sometimes, as a result of such resistance, the 
organizations fail to establish the programs, and, almost 
always, the final product is different from the policy 
makers' and program planners' original conception (Pressman 
and Wildavsky, 1973; Warren, et al., 1974; Hayes, 1982; 
Kelman, 1987). Not surprisingly then, in the case of the
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on-site school mental health program, both the planning and 
implementation of the program did involve a great deal of 
conflict, negotiation, and compromise. And the program, 
which began as what Kelman calls a "policy idea," required a 
great deal of time and energy to become a "real world 
outcome" (Kelman, 1987).
The decision-making process was quite elaborate, 
especially in comparison to the relatively small amount of 
funds involved. Planning and decision-making included the 
two primary participating municipal organizations, the New 
York City Department of Mental Health, Mental Retardation, 
and Alcoholism Services, and the New York City Board of 
Education. In addition, other organizations were involved, 
including New York City's Office of Management and Budget 
(Budget Office); the Mayor's office; the United Federation 
of Teachers (UFT); the community school districts; the 
community mental health agencies and hospitals; State 
regulatory and funding authorities, including the State 
Office of Mental Health and the State Department of Health; 
and other organizations with a stake in the program. Along 
the way, "political choices" (Kelman, 1987:6), "program 
production" (or implementation), (7) and "final governmental 
action" (7), all contributed to the outcome. Also along the 
way, different players contributed to the outcome, 
advocating for their own organizational priorities, while 
interpreting policies and plans through their organizational
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"world view." And, over time, policy makers' views changed, 
so that the already planned program was modified to meet new 
and changing priorities.
Of much more than academic interest are the issues of 
how things get accomplished, and why things do or do not get 
accomplished, especially when the "things" are public 
(Williams, 1982:vii). As the public sector has grown, and 
as more and more is expected of it, there has been greater 
scrutiny of public programs. Also, during the present 
decade, there has been increased questioning of the efficacy 
of government efforts to ameliorate problems. Such efforts 
have been under intense scrutiny ( e.g., submitted to cost 
benefit analyses and other exercises of accountability), 
from within the public sector itself, as well as from the 
public-at-large. This has been especially true in New York 
City ever since the fiscal crisis of 1975. As program 
development supported by public funding has increased, a 
number of case studies of policy-making and program 
implementation within the public sector have been conducted; 
these studies describe how policy choices are made and how 
these choices are translated into programs.
The case study approach is especially well-suited to 
research on the policy implementation process. In The 
Implementation Game. Bardach (1977) described the types of 
"games" that are likely to be played by the various players 
and which can strain and block the implementation of even
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the most well intentioned programs, at both the State and 
Federal levels. Bardach, a proponent of the case study 
approach, writes, "the political and institutional 
relationships in an implementation process on any but the 
smallest scale are simply too numerous and diverse to admit 
of our asserting lawlike propositions about them. It is the 
fragmentary and disjunctive nature of the real world that 
makes a 'general theory of the implementation process'
(which has been urged upon me by some readers of the draft 
manuscript) unattainable and, indeed, unrealistic" (57).
Other writers have also cautioned against grand 
theorizing and recommend the case study approach in order to 
understand the implementation process (Nelson and Yates, 
1978; Palumbo, 1985). Palumbo (1985), for instance, points 
out that the sort of rationality employed in implementation 
is usually "retrospective," rather than prospective. That 
is, a sort of trial and error approach is employed in 
successful implementation, and it is only in retrospect that 
the organization involved can develop the rationale for why 
things turned out the way they did. Mintzberg and McHugh 
(1985) concluded that this retrospective understanding of 
the implementation process can be gained only through the 
case study approach because this is the only approach that 
provides a close enough view of the organization.
While each level of government is fraught with 
problems, city government tends to have particularly
distinctive ones, associated both with the structure of 
decision-making and the types of problems it 
characteristically deals with (Yates, 1977: 9). Also, 
municipal government, more than federal or state government, 
is on the front line in dealing with difficult problems. 
According to Yates, "...urban policy making takes place in a 
political and administrative system that is fragmented to 
the point of chaos..." He characterizes this as 
"street-fighting pluralism," which is a "pattern of 
unstructured, multilateral conflict in which many different 
combatants fight continuously with one another in a very 
great number of permutations and combinations" (34). Also, 
issues often take on symbolic dimensions (120), with 
meanings and associations beyond the issue at hand. For 
example, political opponents can transform a strike, a 
school closing, or a building project into a major 
confrontation along neighborhood lines, or along racial, 
ethnic, or class lines. Yates (125) gives the example of 
the New York City transit strike of 1966, in which Mayor 
John V. Lindsay "pushed the conflict into a symbolic plane 
by defining it as one between the power brokers ... and the 
public interest. Not to be outdone, Mike Quill [the union 
leader] retorted that the conflict was really between the 
upper class elite and the little guy." Such symbolic 
associations can transform an issue so much that the 
political battles being fought by the various players become
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"zero sum games," in which victory for one side implies 
defeat for the other, with compromise often impossible.
While tangible resources can often be divided, symbolic ones 
are not so divisible (Yates, 1977).
In addition, when city government attempts to carry 
out decisions, many service delivery issues are raised. 
"Reliable answers do not exist for many of the city's most 
pressing problems, and, seen in this light, the erratic 
search for solutions that has characterized urban governance 
is perhaps easily understood" (Yates, 1977: 79). Service 
delivery organizations possess different institutional 
histories, as well as different structures and cultures. 
Also, public organizations, at least, often have their own 
"street level bureaucracies" (Lipsky, 1980; Yin and Yates, 
1975), which refers to the representatives of governmental 
organizations who have direct interaction with citizens, 
such as police and fire personnel, teachers, and 
caseworkers.
In addition to the political dimension which influences 
the course of all public programs, studies have demonstrated 
that there exist certain organizational factors which 
influence inter-organizational relations, and, therefore, 
the course of public programs, as well. Many of these 
studies have been conducted within the human services field 
(Morrissey, et al., 1981). Among the factors which have been 
shown to influence the level and quality of interaction and
cooperativeness among service organizations are the 
following: institutional philosophies (Miller, 1958); 
resource needs and requirements (Levine and White, 1961; 
Levine, et al., 1963; Aiken and Hage, 1968); and, the 
presence or absence of an "institutionalized thought 
structure," (Warren, et al., 1974) (i.e., a shared view of
the problem to be addressed, a shared view of the strategies 
for solutions, and an implicit understanding of the 
participating organizations' turfs and boundaries).
Further, as Hall (1986) points out, human service 
organizations, especially, are staffed by professionals from 
various disciplines, each discipline with its own 
vocabulary, technology, professional orientation and 
philosophy, and turf. The relations among members of 
professional groups can affect the relations of the 
organizations within which the members of these various 
groups work (154). Finally, organizations have a cultural 
dimension, and can be characterized as systems of symbols 
and meanings (Smircich, 1983; 35). Some studies have 
explored the multi-cultural character of single large 
organizations, identifying subcultures, occupational 
communities and other cultural units (Gregory, 1983; Riley, 
1983), all of which, individually, possess their own systems 
of symbols and meanings. Cultural differences across 
organizations are likely to be even more pronounced 
(Pettigrew, 1983; Smircich, 1983). The various pushes and
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pulls among groups can contribute to the chaotic nature of 
urban policy games (Yates, 1977) .
My case study of the development and implementation of 
the on-site school mental health program will (similarly to 
the studies described above) explore a variety of issues, 
including the following: inter-organizational relations; 
organizational culture; professional relations; political 
decision-making; and, implementation. Some of these issues 
were most significant during one particular stage in the 
development of the program, and others were significant 
throughout all of the stages. For example, during the 
earliest planning stages, the focus was on political 
decision-making at high levels of municipal government.
And, during the later stages, when the program was being 
established in schools, the organizational culture of 
schools and mental health agencies became of greater 
concern. Finally, throughout the entire planning and 
implementation process, interorganizational relations was a 
key focus.
In the following chapter, I will describe the 
methodology of the study, and discuss some methodological 
issues raised in a study of this type. In the chapter 
following that one, I provide some background on the history 
and structure of the Public Schools and the Mental Hygiene 
Department, as well as on school mental health services, in 
particular. Then, in the six succeeding chapters I will
describe the six stages and decision points, which will 
trace the history of the program's development. Finally, 
a concluding section, I provide further discussion and 
suggest areas for further study.
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II. METHODOLOGY AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
IDENTIFYING THE RESEARCH TOPIC
This research project emerged from my experience —  
beginning in 1983 —  as one of the program planners at the 
Department of Mental Health working to develop and implement 
the on-site school mental health program. I was both a 
participant and observer, and as Yin (1982) points out, "the 
opportunity for participant observation in an implementation 
experience must be considered rare. [The participant can] 
interpret key events in a manner that extends beyond the 
available documentary evidence"(47). I found that, also, 
because of my insider knowledge, I knew which other 
participants could provide additional information and 
different perspectives, as well as which written materials 
could contribute to the "credibility" (Guba, 1981) of the 
analysis.
This research is an example of what Riemer (1977) calls
"opportunistic research," in that an occasion presented 
itself in the course of everyday life which was suitable for 
research (see also Krieger 1985, who writes of beginning 
research "unwittingly"). Riemer (1977) identifies three 
varieties of opportunistic research: taking advantage of 
unique circumstances or timely events; taking advantage of 
familiar social situations; and, taking advantage of special 
expertise (469-472). This study combines all three 
varieties, since I was in the right place at the right time, 
with appropriate skills and professional perspective.
Rather than participation presenting merely a problem of 
bias, Riemer suggests that it can be a benefit to what he 
refers to as, acknowledging C. Wright Mills, "the 
sociological imagination" (468).
As part of my job, I participated in the planning and 
implementation of the program. This included comparing 
different service program models, reviewing rules, 
regulations and statutes, writing proposals, correspondence 
and requests for proposal, developing budgets, staffing 
patterns, and policies and procedures, and attending a 
tremendous number of meetings at which the content of these 
were discussed. At the same time that I was involved in 
these activities as part of my livelihood, I was trying to 
make sense of what I was observing and participating in. 
Again, I was able to draw upon both my prior employment 
experiences and my academic training, in order to be more
effective in carrying out these responsibilities. In 
addition, my intellectual curiosity about the nature of 
organizations and organizational change had been piqued. My 
academic experience at that point included a Masters degree 
in Anthropology and some course work for the doctorate in 
Sociology. Relevant work experience included applied social 
research and policy analysis for the New York State Council 
on Children and Families (a State government agency 
concerned with children's social welfare issues), admissions 
and recruitment administration in a New York City public 
alternative high school, and public and private secondary 
school teaching in New York City and Albany, New York.
As I continued working on implementing the program, I 
began to recognize that my vantage point provided an 
opportunity to document the development and implementation 
of the program in some detail. I also learned that this 
was a relatively unusual opportunity and that there was a 
need in the field of Sociology for greater knowledge and 
understanding of program implementation. In addition, there 
were relatively few glimpses into the political and 
organizational life of public administrative agencies, and 
there was a need for greater information in this area 
(Viteritti, 1990).
I found that participating in the design and 
implementation of the program engendered a deep level of 
commitment. At the same time, effective functioning in a
large and complex municipal bureaucracy involved my constant 
awareness of diplomacy, compromise and caution. Since the 
objectivity of a participant observer can be challenged, Yin 
(1982) advises the use of different kinds of information, 
which can help bolster an argument. In particular, he 
mentions documents as a "rich source of information" (47), 
and I have, in fact, utilized numerous public documents and 
internal documents, as well as studies of specific 
organizations, such as the Board of Education, the mental 
health system, and other organizations involved in this 
study. My use of these documents is intended to expand and 
support my narrative, as well as to provide historical 
information to establish a context to describe the program. 
Also, these documents were invaluable in enabling me to 
describe significant events connected to the on-site school 
mental health program's development which occurred prior to 
my employment at the Department of Mental Health. In 
addition, I hope, as Viteritti (1983) phrased it, regarding 
his own study of the New York City Public Schools, (which 
was based on his years as a special assistant to the 
Chancellor), that, "whatever objectivity [is] sacrificed by 
familiarity can be offset by the insights allowed through 
proximity" (vii).
Having recognized that I had a unique vantage point 
from which to observe the program, and also recognizing that 
this vantage point provided the basis for a potentially
interesting Ph.D. dissertation, I gradually expanded my 
involvement in the program from that of a participant to 
that of both a participant and a participant-observer. I 
emphasize the distinction, because, unlike in some other 
instances of participant-observer research where 
participation follows the assumption of the observer role 
(Jorgensen, 1989: 20-22), in my case, the research role 
followed the participant role. Also, in my case, the 
research role never predominated, since I continued to be 
active in the planning and implementation of the program I 
chose to study. And, during my tenure at the Department of 
Mental Health (April 1983 to June 1989), I assumed 
increasingly responsible positions, moving from planning 
analyst to senior planning analyst, then to Assistant 
Director of the Office of Planning and Project Management, 
and, finally, to Assistant Commissioner for Planning and 
Project Management (from 1986 to June 1989). Throughout, 
however, I was involved with the on-site school mental 
health program. When I began to consider the topic for a 
dissertation I informed my immediate supervisor, who 
approved of it.
This study is concerned mostly with the period 1981 
(prior to my employment in the Department), before the 
program was planned, to early 1985, by which time services 
were being offered in almost seventy schools. (I do, 
however, also present information on some aspects of the
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program which involved events in subsequent years.)
APPROACH
The study is concerned with the program's evolution, 
from the participants' initial recognition of the need for 
such a program, through the development of a program model, 
to the implementation of the program. The data include my 
observations and experiences as an "insider" for over three 
years in the planning, implementation, and management of the 
program. In addition, other data came from documents and 
recollections of others who participated in the planning and 
implementation of the program. Therefore, data analysis 
included the organizing of my own observations and 
experiences as a participant observer (Sanday, 1983;
Lincoln, 1985), as well as the analysis and interpretation 
of documents pertaining to the planning and implementation 
of the program. The study is, for the most part, a 
retrospective reconstruction, in that the evnts described 
occurred prior to my proposing the dissertation and having 
the proposal approved. By that time, as part of my work, I 
had amassed an enormous amount of documentation about the 
program, including internal memoranda, reports, 
correspondence, and notes from meetings and other 
discussions. Also, there existed public documents: 
proposals and plans; status reports; and letters, among 
others. All this material gave depth and credibility to my
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reconstruction. In addition, because I remained in the 
setting, I had first-hand evidence of the outcome of the 
events. In addition, through formal and informal 
discussions with other participants and observers, a more 
complete picture developed.
The conceptualization of stages and decision points 
provides an organizational framework for the presentation of 
the study. The conceptualization is the result of my 
initial analysis of data about the program's implementation. 
The study is structured so that it begins with a description 
of the program's evolution, followed by an analysis, (which 
is organized into stages and decision points in the 
establishment of the program) in order to illustrate the 
specific steps of program development in urban child mental 
health services, within a specific multi-organizational 
environment. The stages are, in part, but not fully, 
chronological, in order to capture the "action" of program 
development. And each decision point represents a point of 
agreement among the organizational players; these points of 
agreement had enabled program development to proceed.
It should be made clear from the outset that this 
structure —  i.e., the "stages" and "decision points" —  
emerged from my analysis of the data (see also Harmon,
1989). There was not an a priori "course" for the 
development of the program which was evident to, and shared 
by, all the program planners and policy makers (Mintzberg
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and McHugh, 1985). Program design and implementation moved, 
at best, incrementally. As Hauschildt puts it, "decision­
makers develop their goals in a continuous dialectical 
process with their search for alternatives and their view of 
the situation" (Hauschildt, 1986: 12). Berman (1978) 
writes, "The particular micro-implementation path that is 
followed depends on the interplay of the project with the 
local organizational setting" (174).
In order to describe the interplay referred to by 
Berman above, not only a description of the project, but 
also a description of the organizational setting, has to be 
rendered. However, the "setting" is itself ever-changing.
As Emery and Trist (1965) put it, "a main problem in the 
study of organizational change is that the environmental 
contexts in which organizations exist are themselves 
changing, at an increasing rate, and towards increasing 
complexity" (21). There is not a static backdrop against 
which to describe the changes which occur in the 
implementation of a new program. And, when the new program 
is a joint program, the "environmental contexts" multiply 
and the interactions increase significantly (Emery and 
Trist, 1965).
For example, the macro-implementation phase of the 
development of a new approach to school mental health 
services was influenced by change in leadership in the 
Public Schools, litigation regarding special education,
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changing fiscal constraints, and the political rivalry 
between the Mayor and the City Council President. Each of 
these played a role in the progress of program development 
and the design of the program. At the micro-implementation 
phase, the unique characteristics of each school district, 
school and mental health agency (including structural and 
interpersonal dynamics) were influential.
Social service delivery organizations, in particular, 
are "extraordinarily 'open' to their local environments," 
according to Berman (1978). Thus, "their nonmarket and 
public nature implies an environment whose 'causal texture,' 
to borrow Emery and Trist's concept (1965), is an odd 
mixture of placidity and turbulence. Placidity reflects the 
captive clients and the absence of a market in public 
delivery situations. But turbulence sporadically arises 
because public organizations must respond to exogenous 
events (e.g., changes in government policies, trends in 
economic and social conditions, and in fads in technology) 
as well as interact with their strictly local environment. 
They are, in short, prone to uncontrollable and uncertain 
events" (1978:175-76).
These contextual elements need to be described to make 
descriptions of program planning and implementation 
"credible" (Guba, 1981). Thus, in the next chapter, I 
provide background on both organizational and governance 
structures of the two lead organizations, as well as on the
broader systems in which they operate and play key roles. 
Then, I give some historical background about the more 
specific topic of mental health services for children in the 
schools.
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III. BACKGROUND: THE TWO PRIMARY ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
IN THE ON-SITE SCHOOL MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM
In this chapter, I will briefly compare and describe 
the two chief organizations involved in the program's 
planning and implementation (Berman, 1978: 168), and then I 
will provide some historical background on the development 
of the mental health services that had been provided in New 
York City's public schools prior to the on-site program.
This information should be useful in providing a context for 
understanding the joint effort to bring outside mental 
health agencies into the schools. As Berman (1978) states, 
"the gestalt of local system dynamics needs to be understood 
before analyzing the foreground of project implementation" 
(174).
First of all, the relative size of the two 
organizations had a significant influence on their 
relationship. The New York City Public Schools is a much 
larger organization than the Mental Hygiene Department. 
Naturally, therefore, the magnitude of the two municipal 
agencies' respective budgets was quite different (as was the
place of the mental health funding in the budgets): in
Fiscal Year 1981, the overall Public School budget was $2.6 
billion, of which $299 million was for special education 
services for 91,000 children. The Mental Hygiene Department 
budget was much smaller; its budget was $118 million, of 
which the school funding was 4.5 million (New York City, 
Office of Operations, 1981). (Also, it should be noted that 
while the Public School budget accounted for just about all 
the public money spent on education in New York City, the 
Mental Hygiene Department's budget, per se, represented only 
a fraction of public mental health funding for New York City 
residents. Other major funding sources included Medicaid 
and other third party reimbursement sources, State funding
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for State-operated programs, etc. Thus, the Mental Hygiene 
Department could exercise much less authority over its 
system than could the Public Schools’ leadership over its 
system.)
A structural correlate of the large size of the school 
system (Scott, 1975: 11-12) is the fact that it can be 
viewed as a rather complex organizational field itself (more 
complex than the Mental Hygiene Department). The Public 
School system includes the Central Office, with a large 
number of divisions, bureaus and units, 32 community school 
district boards, and, within each district, 25 or more 
schools. The Public School system also employs a large 
number of administrative, pedagogical and support personnel
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to directly operate it.
The Mental Hygiene Department, on the other hand, is a 
smaller, more unified organization; it is a part of a large 
organizational field which includes State, municipal, and 
voluntary mental health providers, as well as other 
organizations. It is an administrative agency, since, 
rather than operating programs or delivering services 
directly (except in the case of evaluation services provided 
to the Courts), it administers contracts with providers, and 
oversees their activities with a relatively small staff, as 
compared to the Public Schools. Most of its budget is used 
to help fund the services of over a hundred services 
provider agencies. The Department relates to these agencies 
in a variety of ways. The Department monitored the agencies 
individually in regard to budget, service quality, and 
service quantity. The agencies themselves, however, are 
relatively independent, since they receive financial support 
from other government entities, their own fund-raising, and 
third-party health insurance reimbursements. Also, included 
among these agencies were some of the nation's leading 
medical and social service organizations, with powerful 
boards of directors, autonomous missions, and resources.
NEW YORK CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION
The New York City Board of Education has been the 
subject of a number of studies, both because of its
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contentious history and because its problems have come to 
represent the problems of all large urban school systems 
(Ravitch, 1974; Rogers, 1968; Rogers and Chung, 1983).
Those studies, however, looked at the overall school system; 
this study is unique because it takes an in-depth look at 
the establishment of one program.
The New York City Board of Education ("Public
Schools") had, in 1981, a budget of almost three billion
dollars (New York City, Office of Operations, 1981). It was 
at that time, and still is, responsible for the education of 
approximately one million students annually. The seven 
members of the Board of Education are appointed by the Mayor 
and the five borough presidents. The Board, in turn, selects 
a chancellor, who is responsible for the day-to-day
management of the school system. The system consists of a
central administration and 32 local community school 
districts. Each of the local districts has a locally- 
elected school board which hires a district superintendent 
who is responsible for the operation of the district's 
twenty to thirty elementary and junior high and intermediate 
schools. The local district has a substantial amount of 
autonomy for budgeting, personnel, and curriculum, within 
constraints of the central administration budget controls 
and collective bargaining contract between the Board of 
Education and the United Federation of Teachers (Gittell, 
1980). The central administration is responsible for the
approximately one hundred high schools through the Division 
of High Schools; it is responsible for delivery of special 
education services to over one hundred thousand children 
through the Division of Special Education; and, it is 
responsible for guidance and other support services to all 
school children through the Office of Student Progress 
(formerly the Office of Pupil Personnel Services, and, prior 
to that, the Bureau of Child Guidance). Table 4 is a table 
of organization of the central administration in 1981.
In 1968, David Rogers used the phrase "bureaucratic 
pathology" in characterizing the New York City Public School 
System (12). In 1983, Viteritti indicated that it (school 
system) is "widely perceived as a monument to bureaucratic 
inertia and ineptitude" (xii). Further, he indicated that 
the "schools are part of a semi-autonomous agency that has 
historically placed a high value on separation" (325). By 
most accounts the school system is a very difficult system 
in which to implement planned change, especially if this 
change involves coordination among organizational units or 
with outside organizations. In addition to the isolationist 
tendencies, lines of responsibility and communication are 
often vague and ill-defined. For example, in a November 3, 
1986 New York Times article about two of the most well- 
regarded District Superintendents, the author, Larry Rohter, 
indicated that "superintendents ... are hired —  and can be 
dismissed —  by community school boards, whose members are
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elected, (but) they must rely on the central Board 
ofEducation for everything from textbooks and supplies to 
the money paid to principals and teachers" (Bl).
Many current and former school officials have said that 
this environment inhibits the development and exercise of 
leadership. "The politics outweighs just about everything 
else in the setting," said Dr. Carl Sewell, a former 
superintendent in Brooklyn, quoted in the article mentioned 
above. And he continued, "one who plans to survive has to 
be aware of that and willing at times to make compromises 
that are of political expediency and not to the benefit of 
the kids" (Bl; B4). Also, Dr. Jerome Harris, a 
superintendent in Brooklyn, and one of the subjects of the 
same article said, "the New York system is designed for 
insiders. It's designed for people who come up through the 
system, so that when you get to this level (superintendent), 
you've already been a teacher and a principal.
"The system purifies. When you get to a certain point, you 
think the same way, whether you're black, white or Hispanic" 
(B4). Another superintendent said, concerning the Central 
Board of Education, " ... generally, they don't provide you 
[with] anything to help you run a better school" (B4).
NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH, MENTAL
RETARDATION AND ALCOHOLISM SERVICES
46
The Department of Mental Health, Mental Retardation and 
Alcoholism Services ("Mental Hygiene Department") has not 
received the same amount of attention that the much larger 
Board of Education has. My study will, therefore, 
contribute to a greater understanding of this large and 
important urban mental health organization.
In 1981, the Mental Hygiene Department had an annual 
budget of approximately 120 million dollars (New York City, 
Office of Operations, 1981). The Department was at that 
time, and still is, responsible for providing mental hygiene 
services to 4 00,000 New Yorkers annually through contracts 
with over one hundred voluntary non-profit service 
providers, as well as with the New York City Health and 
Hospitals Corporation. The Department also provides mental 
health services to the City's Criminal and Family Court 
systems and provides funding for the mental health services 
in the prisons. Also, the Department is responsible for 
planning and coordinating the service delivery system. This 
involves a variety of specific roles, including managing a 
community-based planning structure, advocating for mental 
health services at the City and State levels, and exercising 
a coordinative and supportive role in terms of the services 
system, through policy and program development and training.
The City Charter requires that the commissioner of the 
Mental Hygiene Department be a psychiatrist appointed by the 
Mayor. The Mayor also appoints a 15-member Community
47
Services Board to advise the Commissioner on policy matters. 
In addition to funding and monitoring contract agencies, the 
Department has legally-mandated responsibilities to plan 
for, and to oversee, the public mental hygiene system in New 
York City, in collaboration with the several State mental 
hygiene offices.
The Department is organized along three major 
dimensions. The first is functional, containing operations 
and management divisions, each run by a Deputy Commissioner 
reporting to the Commissioner. The second dimension is 
geographic, using the City's boroughs as units for the 
purposes of planning, and operating borough offices to 
oversee program development and contract-agency monitoring. 
The third dimension is operational, containing various 
service system and project configurations; these 
configurations include alcoholism services, mental 
retardation services and mental health services; children's 
services; special population- and, specially-funded services 
(such as community support services and services for 
homeless mentally ill persons). Because of the relatively 
small size of the Department's staff, certain functions such 
as contract management, fiscal services, and management 
information systems are centralized. Major projects require 
cooperation and a team approach —  often referred to as 
"matrix management" —  among staff from the various offices. 
Table 5 is a table of organization for the Department in
4 8
1981.
In 1957, Paul Lemkau, M.D., the first Director of the 
then newly-established New York City Community Mental Health 
Board (the precursor to the Department) wrote that, "it is 
safe to conclude from previous studies that the pattern of 
mental health services in New York City developed 
haphazardly and opportunistically in response to urgent need 
and special interests. In fact, without the factual 
information which well-conceived research could have 
obtained, it was not possible to develop a coordinated 
program for the City as a whole in any other way" (38). 
During the next twenty years, the system grew enormously as 
the result of several factors. The establishment of the 
Community Mental Health Board, following the State's 
Community Mental Health Act, paralleled a national trend in 
the growth of community mental health services, which was 
associated with reductions in State hospital censuses, the 
increased use of psychotropic medications, and, later, the 
growth of medicaid and Medicare funding, which increased the 
access of the poor to community services. The legislation 
governing medicaid did not allow coverage of services 
provided in State hospitals, which furthered the trend 
toward community mental health services (see e.g., Brown, 
1985; Gronfein, 1985).
In 1979, the City's public mental health system 
consisted of various types of providers providing a wide
TABLE 5
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range of services. The system operated under the 
regulatory authority of the State Office of Mental Health 
and the State Health Department. The City Mental Hygiene 
Department had authority, derived from State statutes, to do 
overall planning for the system, and to coordinate service 
delivery. These same statutes, along with the City Charter, 
also gave it authority in terms of providing funding to 
mental health agencies to help support programs, and to 
monitor these agencies' performance through establishing 
contracts which spelled out service and fiscal requirements.
The mental health services themselves were provided by 
"provider" agencies, including State psychiatric centers, 
operated by the State Office of Mental Health; the Health 
and Hospitals Corporation, a public, multi-hospital system; 
some of the City's voluntary non-profit hospitals; and, the 
community-based mental health agencies of various sizes; and 
other public agencies which had mental health-related 
responsibilities, such as social services, corrections, and 
juvenile justice agencies. As large as the public mental 
health system was, it represented only a part of the City's 
mental health delivery organizations (Regier, et al., 1978), 
which includes other facilities, services, and individual 
practitioners. Also, the mental health system is part of, 
and overlaps with, the City's general health care system.
Within what appeared to me as a rather complex, often- 
fragmented and sometimes chaotic system, there are certain
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links and alliances which contribute to cohesion. These 
links may result from any one —  or a combination —  of the 
following: proximity of agencies to each other, forming a 
kind of community service network; shared affiliations with 
medical schools or other academic and research institutions; 
or, common services orientation or service population, which 
may form links that are useful in advocacy, lobbying, 
promotion of innovations, etc.
Those agencies which predominantly served children 
maintained such an alliance, and this contributed to the 
eventual development and implementation of the on-site 
program. Those agencies had representatives who served as 
advisors to the Mental Hygiene Department. They also were 
strong advocates for more support for children's services 
and the leadership of the Mental Hygiene Department had 
identified children's services as an area in need of such 
support. Also, most, if not all, of the agencies serving 
children belonged to the Coalition of Voluntary Mental 
Health Agencies, which was a trade association for New york 
City's community mental health agencies, and advocated on 
their behalf with City and State officials. The executive 
directors of the children's agencies also had close contacts 
with the Mental Health Association of New York and Bronx 
Counties, whose Director, Carol Horn, was an outspoken 
advocate for children's mental health services.
It was generally believed that community based mental
health services were not reaching the children who most 
needed them. A review of programs with low levels of 
services, conducted by Department staff, indicated that a 
significant percentage were those whose target population 
were children and youth. Often, children would not receive 
services until their problems had already reached an acute 
stage, resulting, perhaps, in the need for hospitalization 
or other intensive service. During the city's fiscal 
crisis, prevention and outreach services were the first to 
be cut.
Because of the relatively small size of the Department 
itself, and because of its subsequent high degree of 
centralization as an administrative rather than an operating 
agency, the various units within the Department were able to 
move relatively swiftly to coordinate their efforts once a 
priority (in this case, children's services) was identified, 
and once resources became available for the service provider 
agencies to use. Further, the children's mental health 
agencies themselves provided support for these efforts, and 
were eager to participate in establishing new programs. 
However, as mentioned earlier, the mental health system did 
not command excess resources, nor had its advocates, in 
spite of their linkages and their lobbying efforts, been 
particularly effective at protecting children's mental 
health services funding from the cuts during the City's 
fiscal crisis.
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EARLY BACKGROUND OF MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES IN THE
SCHOOLS
At least as early as 1931, the need for mental health 
services for school children in New York City had been 
recognized by school and other City government officials. In 
that year, the Bureau of Child Guidance within the public 
school system was established, "for the diagnosis and 
treatment of maladjusted and atypical pupils" (New York City 
Board of Education, 1931: 294).
In December 1954, the New York City Community Mental 
Health Board was established, as the result of the State's 
Community Mental Health Act (pursuant to Article 8A of the 
State Mental Hygiene Law). This Act provided for State 
matching funds for local government mental health programs 
throughout New York State. The Act required that a Community 
Mental Health Board be established in order to administer 
the funding of local mental health programs, and was 
consistent with a national trend toward expanded outpatient 
mental health services (Brown, 1985). Prior to 1954, the 
City government did financially support mental health 
services provided by the Bureau of Child Guidance, as well 
as by the Department of Hospitals. The 1955-56 fiscal year 
was the first year "that it [mental health services] has 
emerged as a distinct and separate program" (New York City 
Mayor, 1955:40-41). As the result of the creation of the
Community Mental Health Board, the City moved $1,761,354 
from the Public Schools budget to the Community Mental 
Health Board budget for 1955-56 (New York City Mayor, 1955: 
25; New York City Community Mental Health Board, 1957).
This gave the Community Mental Health Board responsibility 
to oversee the mental health services provided by the Bureau 
of Child Guidance, since funds were now allocated by the 
Community Mental Health Board to the Public Schools. This 
arrangement was to continue until 1983-84, when the on-site 
school mental health program was implemented.
In 1955, a detailed report listing a number of problems 
with the Bureau of Child Guidance was prepared by the Public 
Schools. These problems had interfered with the Bureau's 
successful functioning (New York City Board of Education, 
1955). These problems included the lack of permanent 
leadership (for 13 years there were only acting directors) 
and a lack of clarity regarding the proper goal for mental 
health services provided within the schools. In particular, 
there was confusion about whether the goal of school mental 
health services should be assessment of children in the 
schools, with subsequent referral to certified mental health 
agencies in situations where it was determined that 
treatment services were needed, or both assessment and 
treatment in the schools themselves (New York City Community 
Mental Health Board, 1957: 115-119). These different goals 
had implications for the operation of the Bureau of Child
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Guidance and its relationship to other child-serving 
systems, i.e. whether it should be a mental health service 
provider itself or whether it should rely on the mental 
health system to treat psychiatric and emotional problems in 
children.
Between 1955-56 and 1976, the allocation of mental 
health services funding to the schools grew to a high of 20 
million dollars, as the result of increased awareness of the 
need for such services by both educators and mental health 
professionals. And, approximately four million of those 
dollars were allocated to develop programs for children in 
special education, including classes for emotionally 
handicapped children. However, as will be discussed in 
detail later, the Mental Hygiene Department was not able to 
get basic information from the Public Schools about how 
these funds were being spent. For example, the Public 
schools failed to provide a line item budget for the twenty 
million dollars which it had been allocated for school 
mental health services to be provided by the Bureau of Child 
Guidance. In addition, it was unwilling to develop annual 
service projections, or to provide the monthly statistical 
reports required by the City and state mental hygiene 
agencies of all programs. And the Public Schools did not 
institute the sorts of routine accountability mechanisms, 
both in terms of quality assurance and efficiency, that the 
Mental Hygiene Department demanded of its contract agencies.
Then, during the period 1976-1981, as the result of the 
City's fiscal crisis, the amount of funding for mental 
health services to the schools was progressively decreased 
down to 4.5 million dollars. Beginning in 1975, New York 
City's political life was dominated by the fiscal crisis, 
and, as a result, financial considerations dominated almost 
all policy and program decisions. Overall, the Public 
School system experienced large budget cuts during the 
fiscal crisis. According to Viteritti (43), "...the public 
schools were among the major victims of the fiscal crisis 
that struck New York in 1975. According to a report 
completed in 1976 by the office of the deputy chancellor, 
the schools took a budget reduction of $2 62 million during 
the first year of the crisis... while spending for education 
accounted for 21.6% of the total city budget during the 
three years prior to the fiscal crisis, the schools were 
being required to absorb 25.4% of the cutbacks the city was 
making in its general operating expenses in 1975."
The Mental Hygiene Department, like the Public Schools 
and all other city agencies, experienced funding reductions 
during the period, though these did not attract the kinds of 
political and public attention that the school system's 
budget cuts did. However, within the mental health services 
provider- and advocate- community, these cutbacks did not go 
unnoticed. For example, in a letter to the New York Times 
on February 15, 1976, the Community Council of Greater New
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York criticized cuts in mental health services funds, "which 
would affect 80,000 people" (New York Times, Feb. 15, 1976: 
61) .
Accountability became a paramount issue in the public 
administration and public policy realms. Whereas prior to 
the fiscal crisis, the City's Budget Office was not able to 
hold the Public Schools fiscally accountable, the fiscal 
crisis provided an opportunity for the Budget Office to 
assert itself. The severe cut taken by the Bureau of Child 
Guidance was viewed by some Public School staff as 
reflecting the fact that the Mental Hygiene Department had 
an "ax to grind," since it had not been able to get the 
Bureau to provide fiscal and service utilization budgets and 
reports. (Some of the later resistance to the on-site 
school program by Public Schools employees who had been in 
the Bureau of Child Guidance may have reflected residual 
hostility from this earlier period.)
At the Mental Hygiene Department during the period 
1979-1982, there was a great deal of attention given to 
enhancing all accountability measures, including timely and 
accurate reporting of expenditures and of services delivered 
by the Public Schools. At the same time, the concern about 
the low levels of service by children's mental health 
agencies created increased pressure to have the school 
personnel make referrals to mental health agencies. 
Especially in view of the overall fiscal austerity of the
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period, it was not helpful to the Mental Hygiene Department 
for there to exist even the perception of underutilized 
services, especially in view of the publicly-acknowledged 
need for mental health services for children. Such a 
perception by the Budget Office, the Mayor's Office or the 
Board of Estimate members could result in funding cuts.
The expansion of mental health services for children 
became a high priority of the Mental Hygiene Department, as 
reflected in its annual local plans. This was consistent 
with a growing national awareness that children's mental 
health services were a relatively neglected area of mental 
health policy-making attention and that the incidence, 
prevalence and significance of children's mental health 
disorders were substantial. Because resources were scarce 
and many parents were unwilling to bring children to mental 
health clinics, the Department had determined that the 
schools could be an important link in getting children the 
services they required. Ideally, the Department believed, 
space in the schools should be made available to mental 
health agencies.
It was against this background that efforts to change 
school mental health services began.
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IV. RECOGNIZING THE NEED FOR A NEW APPROACH
SETTING THE STAGE
There are three factors which stand out as catalysts 
for the eventual development of the on-site school mental 
health program. One is the rising cost of delivering 
special education in New York City and the concomitant 
search for less costly alternatives; the second is the long­
standing difficulties the Mental Hygiene Department had in 
monitoring and holding accountable the Public Schools in 
regard to school mental health services; and the third is 
the call for greater collaboration and coordination in 
delivering, and expanding the availability of, health, 
education and social services to children, with specific 
emphasis on the link between schools and other service 
providers. This call came from professionals, advocates and 
public officials, not just in New York City but throughout 
the country.
Since the adoption of Public Law 94-142 in 1975, the 
provision of "free and appropriate" special education 
services had been mandated throughout the country (Chambers 
and Hartman, 1983). Over the years, special education
enrollment and expenses in New York City had grown 
dramatically. In Fiscal Year 1981 (July 1, 1980 - June 30, 
1981) special education expenditures reached just under $300 
million, which is over ten percent of the entire education 
budget (New York City, Office of Management and Budget,
1981: 41). This level of expenditure was occurring just at 
the time of the City's efforts to overcome the fiscal crisis 
which had begun in 1975. There was great pressure from the 
City's Budget Office to control costs. At the same time, as 
the result of the 1975 Law, as well as subsequent legal 
actions by advocacy groups unhappy with the City's 
implementation of the Law's requirements, the Public 
School's performance was constantly scrutinized. Thus, the 
challenge for the Public School officials in charge of 
special education was to make the existing special education 
system function efficiently and equitably. The Public 
Schools were also expected to develop cost-effective 
appropriate alternatives while dealing with an ever-growing 
number of children entitled to a complex range of 
specialized services. And, these children manifested a large 
variety of disabilities which interfered with their 
educational performance.
The second factor which led to the development of the 
on-site program concerned the difficulties in monitoring the 
school mental health services, as discussed in the previous 
chapter. (Briefly, the Mental Hygiene Department had
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provided as much as twenty million dollars per year to the 
Public Schools, without being able to get in return even 
basic budget and service delivery information from the 
Public Schools.)
And the third factor, pressure for improved 
coordination, reflected a variety of concerns about the cost 
and effectiveness of social welfare and education services 
for children in New York City. In the City, there had long 
been interest among children's services providers for better 
linkages with the schools, since school was the one place 
where all children could be reached. It was often difficult 
for agencies to contact and engage those children most in 
need of services, many of whose families were not aware of 
services or did not find them accessible. Also, on the 
policy level, the perceived lack of coordination among 
agencies and different systems, which could result in 
duplication of services and wasted efforts, contributed to a 
sense of disorganization in the City's social welfare system 
for children, and provided ammunition to those who opposed 
social welfare programs in general.
The convergence of these three factors provided an 
opportunity for the development of a new approach to school 
mental health services in New York City, and the various 
pressures on the Public Schools and Mental Hygiene 
Department provided the motivation. These three factors are 
sufficiently distinct and important to be treated
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separately, beginning with the enormous problems faced by 
the Public Schools in implementing Federal and State 
policies in the area of special education.
The Rising Cost of Special Education:
In 1980, the Public Schools restructured the Bureau of 
Child Guidance into School Based Support Teams under the 
auspice of the Division of Special Education. The funds 
provided by the Mental Hygiene Department were to be used to 
help support the activities of School Based Support Teams 
(SBSTs). The transferring of these funds was part of a 
plan, entitled Special Education in Transition, developed by 
a new Chancellor, Frank Macchiarola (New York City Board of 
Education, 1979). Though the Plan described the move as 
part of the incorporation of the Bureau of Child Guidance 
into the Division of Special Education, this reorganization 
eliminated the Bureau of Child Guidance. Also, the plan 
specified how mental health funds would be used and 
accounted for in the context of the overall reorganization 
of the special education system. The plan had input from 
the Mental Hygiene Department. The Department was 
particularly concerned that the Plan would identify specific 
activities that it would fund and be able to monitor. Also, 
the Plan emphasized collaboration between schools and 
community mental health agencies, which reflected the 
interest of the Mental Hygiene Department.
It should be noted that an earlier plan to reorganize 
school mental health services had been proposed in May 1979; 
in addition, there had been discussions at least as far back 
as 1974 about the issue of reorganization. The May 1979 
Plan had called for the elimination of the Bureau of Child 
Guidance and the establishment of a Bureau of School Mental 
Health Services in the Office of Pupil Personnel Services. 
This would have integrated the administration of mental 
health services delivery to both special education and non­
special education students. However, this Plan was "found 
unacceptable" by the Mental Hygiene Department, according to 
the Mayor's Management Report (New York City, Office of 
Operations, 1979: 182). Further, according to the Mayor's 
Management Report, the Mental Hygiene Department had 
indicated to the public schools that "any such plan should 
carefully address the effects of a major funding cut in BCG 
(Bureau of Child Guidance), and should indicate the 
administrative steps the Board can take to minimize the 
impact of any reduction" (182). The May 1979 plan, however, 
had been very general and did not address these issues.
The revised Plan, offered in November 1979, was far 
more detailed, both in terms of the program itself and its 
financial aspects. The School Based Support Teams (SBSTs), 
were "comprised of (a) school principal, a psychologist, a 
social worker, and a special educator" (New York City,
Office of Operations, 1981: 349). These teams were formed
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to screen school children to determine if they required 
placement in special education. The teams were established 
as part of a "comprehensive plan to reorganize and improve 
delivery of services," by the new leadership in the Division 
of Special Education, under the Chancellor's direction (New 
York City, Office of Operations, 1980: 215-216).
The Public Schools were then under mandates from the 
Federal Court to "reduce the existing backlog in evaluation 
and placement of children with handicapping conditions..." 
according to the Mayor's Management Report (New York City, 
Office of Operations, 1979: 236) . The legal pressures on 
the Public Schools had to do with problems of compliance 
with Federal Public Law 94-142, enacted in 1975. Public 
Law 94-142 guarantees "a free appropriate public school 
education to school children with handicapping conditions" 
(David and Greene, 1983: 117). The law also included 
stipulations regarding proper assessment and placement of 
these children, and due process for parents regarding the 
decisions made by school officials which affect their 
children. At that point, the New York City Public Schools 
had been the target of a number of legal suits because of 
alleged failures to follow the regulations regarding the 
timeliness of assessment and placement of children, as well 
as because of alleged bias in the placement of children, due 
to ethnic, linguistic or cultural differences. The result 
of many of these suits was that the Division of Special
Education was forced to operate under the close supervision 
of the courts, with strict timetables governing its efforts. 
In 1985, the Mayor's Commission on Special Education (in its 
report referred to as the Beatty Report) commented on the 
significance of these cases on the Public Schools by 
indicating that, since 1979, these suits "spawned federal 
court judgments, stipulations, and implementation plans that 
now govern (in over 200 separate detailed provisions) 
virtually every facet of the New York City special education 
system..." (New York City, Mayor's Commission on Special 
Education, 1985: 3).
For example, one of the stipulations of the Federal 
Courts required the Public Schools to act within 60 days to 
evaluate and place handicapped children in appropriate 
programs. In 1980, funding for mental health services was 
provided to give the SBSTs an opportunity to provide 
consultative services to other school personnel, to make 
referrals to community-based agencies, and to provide 
short-term assessment and treatment services. As a result 
of the Federal legal requirements, however, the SBSTs 
devoted all their time to screening, assessing and placing 
children in special education, and, therefore, did not have 
the time (nor was it considered a priority) to make 
referrals to community mental health agencies. Also, there 
was strong speculation among the Mental Hygiene Department 
staff that SBST members saw community mental health agencies
as competitors, in that the community agency provided the 
treatment services that the SBSTs wanted to provide. The 
Federal legal requirements which governed the entire special 
education system carried much greater weight than did the 
Mental Hygiene Department in the use of resources within the 
Public Schools, even though the $4.5 million had been 
allocated to the Public Schools to provide mental health 
services.
Management Information Reporting Problems:
One of the ways that the State and City mental 
hygiene departments monitored certified mental health 
agencies was through extensive data-reporting requirements. 
The State and City mental hygiene departments expected the 
Public Schools to meet these same requirements. The 
schools, historically, had not fulfilled these requirements, 
and school officials had at times expressed the view that 
they should not be required to submit reports detailing the 
use of the mental health services funding. In their view, 
these mental health services were a small part of a large 
service system and thus it was difficult to separately 
identify and report on the specific services supported by 
the Mental Hygiene Department. However, the Mental Hygiene 
Department was particularly concerned that its funds be used 
to provide mental health services, and not be used to fund 
educational services. And, in the Mayor's Management Report
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for September 1981, the Mental Hygiene Department's section 
states, "The primary focus during Fiscal Year 1981 was to 
strengthen its planning, monitoring and evaluation 
capabilities to ensure the delivery of high quality 
services. Initiatives included ... negotiation of policy and 
guidelines for monitoring mental health services in the 
Board of Education" (New York City, Office of Operations, 
1981: 323).
Extensive discussions took place between the Mental 
Hygiene Department and the Public Schools regarding problems 
with the promptness of submissions and the accuracy of 
routine administrative reports concerning the mental health 
services funded by the Mental Hygiene Department and 
provided by SBST staff. These reports were intended to 
provide a detailed accounting of the services provided to 
school children by staff paid with Mental Hygiene Department 
funds. These reports were required by the State in order 
for the City to claim approximately $2.25 million in State 
financial assistance. For example, the Mayor's Management 
Report for 1979 (New York City, Office of Operations, 1979: 
23 3) referred to "the primitive" state of management 
reporting throughout the Public Schools. Terms such as 
"unreliable, inaccurate or invalid," were used in regard to 
data (234).
These problems of timeliness and accuracy were 
particularly pronounced within the Division of Special
Education. In 1978, a Touche Ross and Co. study drew "... a 
dismal portrait of the organization and management practices 
of the Division of Special Education and Pupil Personnel 
Services," (New York Times, March 3, 1978: II, 2, 5). The 
lack of accountability within the Division of Special 
Education regarding these services eventually became so 
significant that the City Mental Hygiene Department brought 
the issue to the attention of the State Office of Mental 
Health. The State Office of Mental Health, which provided 
funding to the City to help support a variety of public 
mental health programs, (including funding for services in 
the schools) wrote to the Mental Hygiene Department in 1981 
that it would refuse to grant State Aid for the period 
January 1, 1982 through June 30, 1982 unless the reports of 
expenditures and services activities from the Public Schools 
were improved and made available on a more timely basis.
This action by the State provided the Mental Hygiene 
Department with some leverage with which to try to effect 
some change in the administration of the mental health 
services in the Public Schools, by attracting the attention 
of the Budget Office. Thus, the City Mental Hygiene 
Department wrote to the Public Schools that the funding for 
school mental health services was jeopardized.
When the Mental Hygiene Department still did not 
receive a satisfactory response from the Division of Special 
Education, the State took action, officially holding in
reserve the funds which it provided to the Public Schools 
via the City Department; it was not prepared to make those 
funds available again to the public schools until some 
improvements in documenting service delivery activity and 
expenditures were demonstrated. The Mental Hygiene 
Commissioner made the Mayor and his staff aware of the 
problem. Naturally, the Mayor was quite concerned about any 
loss of State funds to the City. This resulted in added 
pressure on the Public Schools to comply with the data- 
reporting requirements. Subsequently, the Public Schools did 
begin sending the Mental Hygiene Department administrative 
reports which were acceptable. The State then released the 
funds to support the SBSTs services in the schools for the 
coming year. However, the Mental Hygiene Department still 
found it difficult to oversee the mental health services in 
the schools. And, Department staff believed that a more 
effective way to deliver mental health services in the 
schools could be developed.
Services Coordination;
In addition to the data-reporting and fiscal- 
accountability issues, there was another concern about 
mental health services in the schools. This concern was 
that there was little linkage or coordination between the 
schools and those community-based mental health agencies 
which were in contract with the Mental Hygiene Department to
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provide mental health services to children and adolescents.
Concerns about a lack of services coordination were not 
new. In 1953, for instance, prior to the creation of the 
Community Mental Health Board, a study by New York 
University graduate students which reported that "most 
mental health activities are directed toward the children of 
New York City," went on to say, however, that, in spite of 
the scope of these activities, "... no city-wide mental 
health program for children exists. Duplication and lack of 
coordination prevail" (New York University Graduate Division 
of Public Service, 1953: 74). In the 1970s, the provision 
of mental health services to children had become a 
significant issue, both nationally and in New York City.
In particular, the attention given to the issue had to do 
with the lack of available and financially accessible 
outpatient services to children and their families, and the 
resultant reliance on more intensive and restrictive 
inpatient services, especially for Black, Hispanic and other 
ethnic minority children (Knitzer, 1982). There also was 
concern about the overall lack of services for children and 
youth, the lack of coordination among various child-serving 
systems, and the inadequacies of traditional treatment 
approaches in reaching some of the most seriously disturbed 
and underprivileged children and youth.
Amidst this atmosphere in New York City, mental health
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program planners began to view the establishment of programs 
in the schools as an effective way to reach children who 
required mental health services. There existed ample 
documentation regarding the inadequate supply of children's 
mental health services (e.g. President's Commission, 1978). 
In previous years, however, school officials had not 
welcomed outside agencies coming into the schools to provide 
services. According to the 1976 report of The Task Force on 
the New York City Crisis (in mental health services), the 
unwillingness to allow outside agencies into the schools was 
a concession to the teachers union. It also may have 
reflected the rigidity of the school system, as described by 
Rogers (1968). The Task Force report recommended that the 
responsibility for the mental health services provided by 
the Public School Bureau of Child Guidance be turned over to 
the Mental Hygiene Department (New York Times, October 10, 
1976: 68).
In 1981-82, the lack of coordination between the 
schools and community mental health agencies became a 
political issue, linked to under-utilization of children's 
mental health services funded by the Department (New York 
City, Office of Operations, 1981: 325). Carol Bellamy, the 
City Council President, issued a report in February 1981 
which stated that "it is inexcusable that the Board of 
Education (Public Schools) has demonstrated a reluctance to 
use community mental health agencies" (New York City, City
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Council President, 1981: 3).
In addition to criticizing the Public Schools, the 
report criticized the Mental Hygiene Department and its 
contract agencies. The Mental Hygiene Department was 
criticized because it offered "... no effective financial 
incentives for agencies under contract with the City to 
provide all the services they are paid to furnish" (4). In 
regard to the agencies themselves, the report stated that 
"underutilized contract agencies often do not pursue 
rigorous outreach and public education activities to 
improve contract performance" (4). (In fact, Ms. Bellamy 
had expressed these same concerns a year earlier, during the 
Board of Estimate contract approval process. In May 1980, 
Ms. Bellamy sent a letter to her Board of Estimate 
colleagues asking that a large number of the mental health 
contracts pending approval at that time be approved for only 
a three month period, rather than for the usual full year. 
This letter was sent shortly before the vote on the 
contracts, giving the Mental Hygiene Department little time 
either to respond to Ms. Bellamy or to try to persuade the 
Board of Estimate to give the contracts full year approvals. 
However, through the last-minute assistance of the Mayor's 
representative on the Board of Estimate, the contracts were 
approved for a full year.)
The problems in children's mental health services 
provided an opportunity for Ms. Bellamy to embarrass her
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political rival, Mayor Koch, as well as to criticize the 
Public Schools (which had long been a target of criticism by 
politicians). She was also able to demonstrate her concern 
for children to the electorate. At that time, the 
Commissioner of Mental Health, Dr. Sara L. Kellermann was 
only in an acting capacity, so the Mental Hygiene Department 
was in a weak position.
In the year or so prior to Ms. Bellamy's 1981 report, 
The Mental Hygiene Department and the Public Schools already 
were designing new procedures to increase referrals from the 
schools to community-based agencies. A committee composed 
of representatives from the boards of both the Public 
Schools (Board of Education) and the Mental Hygiene 
Department (Community Services Board) had developed a 
written agreement which outlined specific steps to be taken 
in order to increase these referrals. The agreement also 
contained an overall policy statement intended to foster 
cooperation between the mental health agencies and the 
schools. In a June 10, 1981 press release, the Community 
Services Board of the Mental Hygiene Department announced 
details of the agreement. These included the following: 
"dissemination of a statement" regarding increased 
interagency collaboration; issuance of guidelines for 
referrals and cooperative services; forms for referrals and 
follow-up efforts; and, the dissemination of a directory of 
available services in the community, designed to be used by
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school personnel to assist them in making referrals.
Finally, training was also to be provided in order to 
"insure the successful implementation of these measures."
During the Fall of 1981, the two agencies began to 
implement the agreement (New York City, Office of 
Operations, 1981: 325). Staff from the two agencies 
designed an elaborate multi-part referral form to enable 
school personnel to refer children with a need for mental 
health services to community-based agencies. The multi-part 
form allowed both the Mental Hygiene Department and the 
Public Schools to keep track of the referrals. The training 
sessions that were held involved supervisory staff from both 
agencies, direct services personnel from the schools, and 
mental health providers. Discussions at these sessions 
focused upon the most effective use of the forms, as well as 
upon ways of fostering better communication between school 
and mental health agency staff.
The training was delivered in two stages, called Levels 
One and Two. Level One training sessions, which were held 
in each borough, were attended by Public School supervisory 
personnel and Mental Hygiene Department staff. The Public 
School personnel included Regional Supervisors, Committee on 
the Handicapped Chairpersons, and clinical supervisors. The 
Mental Hygiene Department staff included borough 
coordinators and central office personnel. This training 
was designed both to introduce the procedures and goals of
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the agreement to these personnel and to prepare them to 
carry out the Level Two training.
Level Two was designed for school district personnel, 
such as SBST members, community mental health agency 
representatives, and staff from the Mental Hygiene 
Department. It was delivered by the staff trained during 
Level One training. Once the training was completed, the 
mental health agency staff and the SBST members were 
expected to be able to use the forms and procedures. The 
staff from the Mental Hygiene Department would monitor and 
provide technical assistance to the community mental health 
agencies under contract to the Department, while the 
Regional Supervisors would supervise the SBSTs.
The goal of these efforts, according to guidelines for 
the program, was to refer "children in need of mental health 
services which do not reflect an educational need...to 
appropriate community agencies." The guidelines went on to 
state that "there are two groups of children in need of such 
mental and social services." The first of these two groups 
was composed of children who were candidates for referral to 
community agencies alone. This group included: "all 
children requiring long-term therapy; families requiring 
family therapy; all cases of habitual law offenders (e.g., 
known repeatedly to family court, on probation); child abuse 
cases; cases of alcoholism and/or drug addiction." The 
second group was composed of those children who required
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both mental health services and specialized educational 
services. This group included: "children in classes or 
schools for the emotionally handicapped; children in classes 
for the neurologically impaired-emotionally handicapped; 
children with minimum brain disfunction; retarded children 
with emotional handicaps; all children attending special 
schools for the severely emotionally handicapped; school- 
phobic children; truants who need extensive mental health 
services; and pregnant students."
In addition to procedures for referral from the schools 
to community agencies, the guidelines also included 
instructions for making referrals from a community agency to 
the School Based Support Teams in the schools. "This is 
indicated when the treatment plan requires auxiliary, 
on-site services at the school for special placement or to 
support school adjustment."
In December 1981, the joint committee met to review the 
progress that had been made in carrying out the terms of the 
agreement. All of the training —  both Level One and Level 
Two —  had been completed by that time. The training was 
viewed as a success: approximately 1,200 school based
support team personnel and guidance counselors were trained, 
as well as 600 staff from mental health agencies. In 
addition, 30 superintendents of guidance and 100 assistant 
principals were trained, as well as 50 staff from the Mental 
Hygiene Department.
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While the training sessions were successful, certain 
problems with the programs1 design had been identified 
during the training sessions. One of these problems was how 
to determine which information about the children referred 
for mental health services could be shared between school 
and mental health agency personnel and which had to be kept 
confidential. A second problem was that the role of school 
guidance counselors in carrying out the new procedures was 
not yet clear. And a third problem was that, according to 
rumor, some school personnel were circumventing the process 
of gaining parental consent for referrals by avoiding use of 
the parental consent forms. In fact, whether the rumor was 
true or not, some school staff felt that parents would 
resist having children identified as needing mental health 
services. Naturally, this raised issues about the pros and 
cons of parental involvement in decisions which would have 
an effect on their children, and it also confounded the 
efforts of the Mental Hygiene Department and the Public 
Schools to improve program accountability. During the 
following year, when the use of this referral process was 
being evaluated, monthly meetings between school and mental 
health agency personnel were held in each borough to try to 
resolve these problems and to assure that proper procedures 
were being followed.
Throughout this period of evaluation, however, the 
Mental Hygiene Department and the mental health services
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advocacy community maintained a strong and continued desire 
to institute on-site services in the schools, to be provided 
by staff of the community mental health agencies. 
Nevertheless, those involved recognized that it would be 
very difficult to implement such a program, even if 
agreement could be reached to try to do so. A New York 
Times editorial of January 5, 1980 stated that "pilot 
projects (to improve schools) historically have been 
disappointing" (20). This, I think, reflected general 
public and professional sentiments. In general, many of 
those who were advocating for mental health services in the 
schools also felt that "it couldn't be done."
DECISION POINT ONE: THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND MENTAL
HYGIENE DEPARTMENT AGREE TO DESIGN A NEW PROGRAM
In a Spring 1982 meeting that took place between the 
Schools Chancellor, Frank Macchiarola, and the Mental 
Hygiene Commissioner, Sara L. Kellermann, M.D. (in which the 
Chancellor participated as co-chair, along with Marian 
Schwartz of the Mayor's Office, of the mayoral Task Force on 
Youth) the Chancellor "made a commitment that agencies would 
be given physical space for the provision of mental health 
services on site in selected school districts" (New York 
City Department of Mental Health, Mental Retardation and 
Alcoholism Services, 1982: 61). According to Viteritti, the 
Mayor "recognized (the) coordination problem in early 1982,
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when he created a Mayor's Task Force on Youth, the purpose 
of which was to bring about better cooperation among the 
various service agencies. By appointing the chancellor of 
schools as chairman of the task force, (Mayor) Koch hoped to 
lessen the gap that has traditionally existed between the 
schools and municipal agencies" (1983: 325), in coordinating 
the provision of education, health, and social services.
A few months after this meeting, the Mental Hygiene 
Department, in a study of children's mental health services 
needs, documented what they had believed informally all 
along: significant numbers of children were in need of
mental health services in New York City and not getting them 
(New York City Department of Mental Health, 1982).
Further, the study indicated that there were certain 
agencies which were providing mental health services in the 
schools on their own, without either Mental Hygiene 
Department or Central Public School office involvement. And 
these agencies, the report went on to say, "... believe 
that direct access to children and youth in the schools 
improves the quantity and quality of treatment" (DMH, 1982: 
61). Although the Mental Hygiene Department was impressed 
with the results that these agencies achieved on their own, 
its priority was to develop and implement a more systematic 
citywide approach.
The verbal commitment by the schools chancellor to make 
space available to mental health agencies in the schools
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provided impetus for further collaboration between the 
Public Schools and the Mental Hygiene Department. It did 
not, however, in and of itself, create a program.
8 1
V. PLANNING A NEW APPROACH TO SCHOOL MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES
"The restructuring of school mental health services 
will greatly increase access to mental health treatment 
for the general public school population." (from the 
Preliminary Proposal for Restructuring School Mental 
Health Services, February 1983)
In this chapter, I will describe the initial steps 
taken by the Public Schools and the Mental Hygiene 
Department, following the commitment by the Schools 
Chancellor to support the presence of mental health agencies 
in the schools. These steps were intended to make space 
available in the schools for the delivery of mental health 
services to school children. This was occurring at the same 
time that the Mental Hygiene Department and the Public 
Schools were still implementing and evaluating the program 
begun in 1981 to encourage school personnel, including 
SBSTs, to make referrals from the schools to mental health 
agencies in the community. As it turned out, this effort 
was not deemed successful, and this fact aided the cause of 
those trying to bring mental health services agencies into 
the schools.
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BACKGROUND
In the Spring 1982 meeting (mentioned in the last 
chapter), between Chancellor Macchiarolla and Mental Hygiene 
Department Commissioner Sara L. Kellermann, M.D., the 
Chancellor had said that space in the schools would be made 
available for mental health services. This offer, however, 
was just a starting point, and a myriad of major and minor 
issues would have to be addressed before mental health 
services would be delivered to school children in school 
buildings. Thus, while the first decision point had set the 
stage, it did not, by any means, mark the beginning of a 
program. And, although one might make the assumption that, 
once the leaders of these two organizations had agreed to do 
something, it would just happen, the complex organizational 
arrangements of the Public Schools and the Mental Hygiene 
Department assured that nearly all deci'sion-making 
concerning the program would be slow, incremental, and 
provisional. In general, for both lead agencies, the 
implementation of decisions made at the top of the 
organizational structure is contingent on a variety of 
factors which come into play throughout the systems at a 
number of different organizational levels. In fact, 
sometimes, decisions are made which do not result in any 
action whatsoever. As goals become more specific (i.e., the 
decision process is made more explicit and decisions involve 
allocation of concrete resources) the potential for conflict
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increases (see also Benson, 1973; Mathews, 1987). This is 
true in all complex organizations and institutional 
settings; in the public sector, it may be more likely 
because the authority for decisions may not lie in one 
place, and oversight agencies, other branches of government, 
and the vagaries of politics all may affect the ability of 
individual organizational leaders to make decisions that 
have force. Also, the decision-making process itself often 
has multiple functions in the public sector, including 
ideological and symbolic ones, which further complicate the 
making of decisions and the studying of decision-making.
So, several things stood between intention and 
implementation. First, regardless of the authority of the 
Commissioner and the Chancellor within their respective 
systems, there existed innumerable constraints, including 
statutes and regulations governing their systems, as well as 
limits on financial resources and the authority over them.
In addition, space in the schools was itself a limited and 
highly coveted commodity. Within individual schools, 
principals had control of space. Principals were answerable 
to Superintendents, who were themselves responsible, under 
the City's school decentralization plan, to both the 
community school boards and the Chancellor. Thus, making 
space available to mental health agencies reguired decisions 
that would likely affect other programs.
If the Chancellor were to have waited to make a
commitment to the Mental Hygiene Department Commissioner 
until after every single detail had been worked out within 
the Public Schools, it is likely that nothing ever would 
have gotten done, since it is possible (and perhaps likely) 
that such planning would easily have gotten bogged down in 
all sorts of internal administrative, policy and legal 
concerns. Rather, the meeting of the Task Force on Youth 
Services gave the Chancellor an opportunity to send a 
message to those within his system that this was a priority; 
also, since the Task Force was co-chaired by Marian Schwartz 
of the Deputy Mayor's staff, it made the Mayor's office a 
party to the agreement. (Her involvement in later 
discussions between the City and the teachers union, during 
the period when the union was placing obstacles in the way 
of implementation of the program, was significant.) The 
agreement between the Chancellor and the Commissioner also 
was a signal to those opposed to such a program that it was 
time to start paying attention.
In part, due to the political and practical complexity 
of the two major systems, and, in part, due to the complex, 
often fragmented and discoordinated nature of both systems 
(which is characteristic of many service delivery systems 
[Berman, 1978; Lipsky, 1976]), bringing the mental health 
agencies into the schools was not just a matter of opening 
the doors to their staff. The reflexive opposition of many 
within the school system needed to be counter-balanced by an
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effort which drew its legitimacy from a broader agenda.
This broader agenda included the following: the coordinating 
of youth services; the recognition of the need for more 
comprehensive mental health services in the schools; and, 
the pressure to find cost-effective alternatives to special 
education. This effort also required the commitment of 
leadership in several key agencies; and, as will be 
described, the enormous patience and commitment by the staff 
involved to a rather protracted and often frustrating 
process of development and implementation.
My own involvement in the program's development began 
during this stage. I joined the Department in April 1983, 
as a member of the Office of Planning and Project 
Management.
EVALUATION OF A REFERRAL SYSTEM
Several months after that key meeting between the 
Public Schools Chancellor and the Mental Hygiene 
Commissioner, a report was issued evaluating the referral 
mechanism which had been established in the Fall of 1981.
The report was an evaluation of the success of the referral 
mechanism between January 1982 and June 1982, and it showed 
that relatively few referrals had been made by school 
personnel to the community mental health agencies. In fact, 
the forms and procedures designed for this purpose were 
rarely used. Overall, citywide, 520 referrals had been made
during that period, and only half of those had been made by 
SBSTs. And, in view of the total number of children 
projected to be in need of such services —  approximately 
45,000 (New York City Department of Mental Health, 1982) —  
this seemed a very low number. Even if, as is likely, some 
referrals were made to agencies without the use of the 
forms, based on an analysis of the agencies' service 
delivery reports to the Mental Hygiene Department, this was 
a small number, since the total amount of services delivered 
by the agencies did not increase substantially.
There may have been several reasons for the low number 
of referrals. As discussed earlier, SBSTs were under 
pressure to evaluate as many of the children as possible who 
had been referred to special education. This was their 
highest priority, and referrals to community mental health 
agencies took time and involved completing additional forms. 
Also, there appeared to be some jealousy on the part of some 
SBST psychologists and SBST social workers toward mental 
health agency staff. Some complained that mental health 
agency clinicians performed what they viewed as the more 
professionally rewarding and attractive work of 
psychotherapy, while the SBST members performed large 
numbers of assessments, without being given the opportunity 
to engage in clinical practice. In a letter to the New York 
Times in 1980, the former chief school psychologist, Rachel 
Lauer, referred to the "assembly line manner in which school
psychologists examine children." (New York Times, March 15, 
1980: 18).
In addition to SBST staff, guidance counselors could 
make referrals. However, their ranks had been diminished 
severely during the City's fiscal crisis, leaving many 
schools with, at best, part time guidance counselors.
Again, school-mandated activities took up much of their 
time, and reaching out to community mental health agencies 
was time-consuming, though in a few areas of the City, 
individual schools and local mental health agencies and 
hospitals had developed ongoing referral and consultation 
relationships.
PROPOSAL
Based upon the Spring 1982 meeting, Mental Hygiene 
Department staff were prepared to begin working with the 
Public Schools staff to bring mental health agencies into 
schools. As mentioned earlier, the children's mental health 
agencies were anxious to establish a presence in schools, 
and, in fact, some had been able to do so on their own in 
certain areas. And with the commitment of the Chancellor, 
it was hoped that a large-scale effort could be mounted.
The Mental Hygiene Department staff followed up with 
their counterparts at the Public Schools, in order to begin 
making arrangements for mental health agencies to establish 
programs in the schools. Meetings began with the staff of
the Division of Special Education, many of whom had been 
involved over the years in the discussions between the 
Mental Hygiene Department and the Public Schools regarding 
accountability and, more recently, regarding the SBST 
referral effort. However, there was resistance on the part 
of the Division of Special Education staff, largely because 
of ongoing pressure from the union to keep contract agency 
personnel out of the schools. Also, reflective of the 
communication problems between units in a large organization 
like the Public Schools, it appeared that there was not a 
consistent understanding among the school staff about what 
the Chancellor had intended by his agreement with the Mental 
Hygiene Commissioner.
Since the impetus for changing the way school mental 
health services were organized was a response to the 
shortcomings of school mental health services under the 
auspices of the public school system, there may have been 
defensiveness on the part of some school officials to the 
suggestion of change. These shortcomings concerned not just 
the services themselves, but the administrative monitoring 
of the services, and the timely reporting of information to 
the Mental Hygiene Department, which provided funds for 
school mental health services. Over the years, the origin 
of the mental health funds and the specific purpose for 
which they had been made available may have become obscured 
within the overall budget, as well as because of changing
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educational priorities and fiscal pressures. Also, as 
mentioned, there was an ongoing conflict between the 
municipal government and the school system regarding 
budgetary control of the schools and the amount of City 
funding available (Viteritti, 1983) .
In general, the Public Schools and the municipal 
government were used to an embattled relationship, and over 
the years school officials had tried to defend their 
autonomy and rebuff efforts at external accountability 
(Viteritti, 1983). Also, the teacher's union had 
effectively lobbied the Public Schools administration not to 
have contract agency personnel come into the schools to 
provide services. However, when the City's mental health 
services State Aid was threatened, the Mayor's Office and 
the Budget Office supported the Mental Hygiene Department's 
efforts. Also, Frank Macchiarola, unlike previous 
Chancellors, was open to the idea of outside service 
providers coming into the schools, and was strong enough, 
independent enough, and popular enough to be willing to risk 
angering Union officials.
The Mental Hygiene Commissioner contacted the 
Chancellor's office with the intent to reaffirm and clarify 
their agreement so that staff could begin planning. This 
resulted in work beginning during the Fall and Winter of 
1982 on a proposal outlining a school mental health services 
plan. Apparently as the result of the resignation of the
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chief of the Division of Special Education, the Public 
Schools Chancellor gave responsibility for working on the 
proposal with the Mental Hygiene Department to the Director 
of the Office of Pupil Personnel Services, Angelo Aponte, 
who was responsible for guidance, attendance and other 
services for the general school population. Many of the 
Mental Hygiene Department staff involved in the planning 
were those who had been involved in the effort during 1981 
to establish relations between mental health agency staff 
and Public Schools staff.
In a series of meetings, the program planners for the 
two agencies laid out the program; in February 1983, the 
Mental Hygiene Department staff took responsibility for 
completing the proposal. The proposal was very general, 
focusing on the overall distribution of the funds and staff; 
the proposal did not suggest the many implementation issues 
that finally would have to be addressed in order to realize 
a program. The proposal, entitled, "Preliminary Proposal 
for Restructuring School Mental Health Services," described 
two major program components: one component was intended to
improve the coordination of mental health services delivery 
in the schools, with a particular emphasis on increasing 
referrals of school children to community-based mental 
health agencies. This was to occur through reallocating 
some of the funds that were currently in the Division of 
Special Education to the Office of Pupil Personnel Services
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within the Public Schools. The Office of Pupil Personnel 
Services was to create a new position, called "school 
liaison worker." These workers, one in each school, would 
coordinate referrals to agencies in the coirununity. This 
component preserved some of the funds in the Public Schools, 
and reflected the belief that under the right conditions 
school personnel would refer children to community mental 
health agencies.
The second component of the program was designed to 
make mental health services more accessible to 
schoolchildren by bringing agencies into the school building 
to provide mental health treatment services. It was 
important to the Mental Hygiene Department that a new 
program reach those children who most needed services and 
whose families did not seek out services in the community, 
or, if they did seek them out, would not continue using them 
because they did not find these services easily accessible. 
By having mental health specialists in the school building, 
it was believed that it would be easier to get the children 
to begin using services and then to continue to use them; 
for one thing, the services would be more accessible, and, 
for another, valuable information about the children could 
be shared between school staff and mental health staff. It 
was believed by many children's mental health professionals 
that this sort of open communication would definitely 
contribute to the improvement of the treatment of many
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children's mental health problems. This component —  making 
the services more accessible —  involved removing the 
balance of the funds in the Division of Special Education 
entirely from the Public Schools and returning them to the 
Mental Hygiene Department budget. The Mental Hygiene 
Department would then use these funds, plus anticipated 
Medicaid revenues, to develop contracts with certified 
mental health agencies.
The case for this restructuring was based on several 
things. First, as previously mentioned, the evaluation of 
the referral mechanism used by SBSTs to refer children to 
community agencies showed that there were relatively few 
such referrals, especially as compared with the amount of 
money provided by the Mental Hygiene Department. The 
proposal indicated that each of these referrals had "cost" 
$5,625. By creating school liaison workers who would have 
the ability to refer all schoolchildren with a need for the 
services, the planners believed that a far better and more 
cost-effective program could be created. The proposal 
included the projection that 4,500 referrals would result 
from the school liaison workers described in component one 
(as opposed to the small number —  520 —  that had occurred 
during the evaluation period).
Second, while the SBST program was funded at $4.5 
million, in the proposal only $1.5 million was budgeted for 
school liaison workers. This was because it was believed
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that far fewer workers whose full-time job it was to refer 
children could be more effective than the 200 SBST staff who 
were part of a system with other priorities.
Third, if the services were provided by mental health 
agencies, the funding from the Mental Hygiene Department 
would be supplemented by reimbursements from third party 
payers, including medicaid. The schools, which were not 
licensed health care providers, could not bill third party 
payers. Also, the not-for-profit mental health agencies 
contributed some of their own funds, gained through fund­
raising, to the operation of the programs in contract with 
the City. Thus, overall, more services could be provided 
since the program would attract these additional resources. 
In addition, the children's mental health agencies had some 
excess capacity, so that they would most likely be able to 
serve some children without additional funding from the 
City. In fact, the City Council President's report 
(described in the previous chapter) criticized the City for 
"the waste of dollars and the neglect of children" (New York 
City, City Council President, 1981: 3). It was hoped that 
this proposed program could be started in September 1983.
A REVISED PROPOSAL
In February 1983, in the midst of this planning,
Schools Chancellor Macchiarola resigned. Soon thereafter, 
Robert Wagner, Jr., the son of former New York City Mayor
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Robert Wagner, Sr. and an influential Deputy Mayor (who, in 
fact, had been given the responsibility in 1979 by Mayor 
Edward I. Koch to "serve as liaison between OMB (Budget 
Office] and BOE budget officials" [Viteritti, 1983, 52]), 
was selected to be Chancellor. However, before he had 
assumed the position, he was found to lack certain 
educational credentials, according to the State Education 
Commissioner. Therefore, he was not allowed to assume his 
position. Then, Anthony Alvarado, the Superintendent of 
Community School District Four in East Harlem, was chosen to 
be Chancellor. During this period of time, while there was 
this confusion and lack of leadership within the Public
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Schools, efforts on behalf of implementing the on-site 
program were delayed. It became clear to the planners that 
the program would not begin in September 1983, as had been 
hoped. Also, since it had been Chancellor Macchiarola who 
had made the commitment to the Mental Hygiene Commissioner, 
and since the program was not yet off the ground, the fate 
of the program was no longer clear.
It was at this point, in late April 1983, that I joined 
the staff of the Department's planning office, as a planning 
analyst. One of my assignments was to participate in the 
planning of the new program. The Director of the Office, 
Barbara Bengen, and the Assistant Director, Cynthia Dames, 
had been given the responsibility by Commissioner Kellermann 
and Deputy Commissioner Bruce Gantt to lead the Department's
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effort, which involved other offices as well. Because of my 
previous work experiences, which included applied research 
and policy development at the New York State Council on 
Children and Families, as well as secondary school 
administration and teaching, it was a most appropriate 
assignment. I became immediately engaged by it, although I 
certainly had no idea that, a number of years later, I would 
be writing my Ph.D. dissertation about it.
In spite of the turmoil and changes at the top of the 
Public Schools' administration, staff of the Public Schools 
were able to review the proposal submitted in February, and 
to make significant changes. It should be noted that during 
periods of transition in large municipal agencies it is 
often difficult to predict which activities will be affected 
and which will continue as normal. Obviously, day to day 
school operations continued; central office functions were 
the ones most often affected, because of the change in 
personnel that accompanied the transition, and because there 
was a great deal of reviewing and recasting of policies and 
priorities. In this instance, the work of the Office of 
Pupil Personnel Services, which had been reviewing the 
proposal, went on.
I am not able to determine to what extent the changes 
proposed were the result of the changes in leadership at the 
Public Schools. In general, changes in the environment 
account for a good deal of why it is so difficult for public
96
organizations, especially, to set directions and move toward 
established goals in a linear, predictable fashion (Cohen, 
March and Olsen, 1972). These organizations find themselves 
constrained by the activities and domains of other 
organizations, as well as by their own internal limits. 
Therefore, they often find themselves changing directions in 
response to changing priorities, policies, and resources. 
And, of course, goals do shift over time, and different 
goals "compete11 for attention (Tuite, et al., 255).
The most significant change in the revised version of 
the proposal was that component one, deploying school 
liaison workers to refer children to mental health agencies, 
was dropped at the suggestion of the Public Schools; this 
change was, in some ways, surprising, since the Public 
Schools have generally been loathe to give up any resources. 
It is most likely that the component was dropped because the 
Public Schools, under budgetary pressure, did not want to 
increase its personnel. Also, in view of the uncertain 
future of the program and its potentially controversial 
nature, the Public Schools might not have wished to create a 
new job title and to hire new staff should the program be 
terminated at some point.
Instead, the plan was revised so that all the funding 
was to be for the establishment by community mental health 
agencies of on-site mental health programs. The program 
would be implemented in three or four schools in each of 15
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districts out of the total of 32 community school districts 
in New York City. The 15 districts were selected based on 
need, as measured by the number of requests for assistance 
for the SBSTs received in the district. These districts 
corresponded to areas of the city most in need of children's 
mental health services, as determined by the Mental Hygiene 
Department. It was reviewed again by the Public Schools 
staff during August. The plan was made final in September 
1983.
DECISION POINT TWO: THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND MENTAL
HYGIENE DEPARTMENT AGREE ON A PROGRAM DESIGN
In September 1983, the Public Schools and the Mental 
Hygiene Department agreed to implement the program described 
in the proposal. They then forwarded the plan to the Budget 
Office, since funds were to be shifted from the Public 
Schools' budget to the Mental Hygiene Department's budget.
It is noteworthy how long it took to move from the 
initial meeting in Spring 1982, to a proposal that had the 
agreement of the two agencies, in September 1983. As should 
be clear, although there was a great deal of writing, 
editing, and rewriting going on, the time was not taken up 
merely by the writing of the proposal. Rather, the time 
involved may be indicative of the decision process at work, 
especially within the Public Schools, which at this point, 
had more at stake in the restructuring. As mentioned
earlier, the Public Schools had a long tradition of 
maintaining autonomy. Thus, there was a great deal of 
resistance to 1) giving greater control to the Mental 
Hygiene Department; 2) giving up resources, even if the 
resources had originally come from the mental health system; 
3) causing any conflict with the Teacher's Union (UFT), if 
the potential gain was not viewed as necessarily worth it. 
Also, within the Public Schools (as in many bureaucracies), 
historically there has been a larger price paid for making a 
mistake than for not acting or waiting. Therefore, even 
though there was a verbal agreement between the Mental 
Hygiene Department Commissioner and the Schools Chancellor, 
there existed an inertia, which was not easy to overcome.
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VI. FISCAL CONSTRAINTS ON IMPLEMENTING A NEW APPROACH TO SCHOOL
MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES
Reflecting its enormous power during and since the 
City's fiscal crisis, the Budget Office partially "coopted" 
(Selznick, 1966) the on-site school mental health program, 
shaping the program's goals toward its own ends (ends 
neither envisioned nor desired by the program's designers). 
More specifically, the power of the Budget Office to "coopt" 
the initial program design is an example of Selznick's 
(1966) notion of "informal cooptation," wherein 
"... individuals upon whom the group is dependent for funds 
or other resources may insist upon and receive a share in 
the determination of policy" (14).
BACKGROUND
The Budget Office had exercised tremendous power and 
influence in the City ever since the City's fiscal crisis in 
1975-76. The Director of the Budget Office reported 
directly to the Mayor. The Budget Office's role was to plan 
the City's budget, monitor expenditures, forecast revenues, 
and anticipate and plan for changes in the City's economy
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that would affect municipal finances. The Budget Office 
also had the authority to recommend management improvements 
throughout City government.
All budget requests from City agencies (that is, 
requests to make expenditures), had to be approved by the 
Budget Office. This included even those requests that were 
funded entirely —  or in part —  by non-City funds. Also, 
the Budget Office, in exercising its budgetary discretion, 
often made program policy decisions that the Commissioners 
and other leaders of City agencies believed should have been 
left to their discretion. Viteritti (1983) quotes a budget 
office official as saying, "OMB has an inordinate amount of 
authority. We know the Mayor's priorities. It's our job to 
put them into policy" (52).
The relationship of the Budget Office to the Public 
Schools was somewhat different (both in law and in fact), 
than its relationship to the other City agencies. The other 
City agencies, including the mental Hygiene Department, 
reported directly to the Mayor. The Public Schools, 
however, were not a mayoral agency, and did not report 
directly to the Mayor (although the Mayor did appoint some 
members of the Board). Rather, the Public Schools had been 
created by State Charter, and it was supposed to exercise 
educational policy autonomously. According to Viteritti, 
however, "the City school district is also fiscally 
dependent (on the City), and that arrangement sometimes
forces school officials to compromise their autonomy when 
they solicit funds from the municipal government. School 
officials have come to realize that it is easier to extract 
money from the local budget when they can be specific about 
what they want to do with it, why it is important, and who 
will benefit. However, jealous of their own autonomy, they 
do not like to be told to do these things" (60) . In 
general, the Public Schools had been unwilling to capitulate 
to Budget Office directives for improved accountability, 
and, because of their size, governance structure, and a 
relatively relaxed attitude to fiscal accountability in the 
City prior to the fiscal crisis, they had been successful at 
getting City funds prior to the fiscal crisis, without such 
accountability.
Because of this refusal on the part of the Public 
Schools, relations between the Budget Office and the Public 
Schools were particularly strained in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. Since the schools received State Aid in 
addition to local funds, and since the City was under much 
fiscal pressure, the Budget Office used any additional State 
funding to reduce the amount of City funds being spent. 
Viteritti refers to this as "disinvestment" in education, on 
the part of the City (47-49). In 1980, for example, both 
Mayor Edward I. Koch and Comptroller Harrison J. Goldin 
decried the huge size of the special education budget, and 
Koch criticized the federal government for mandating
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expenses while not providing funds (New York Times, May 16, 
1980: II, 3; July 9, 1980, II, 3; September 6, 1980, 23).
The Budget Office's assumption and exercise of greater 
authority illustrates a more general phenomenon of the late 
1970s and 1980s, called the "fiscalization of social 
policy." The term refers to the fact that social policy 
considerations had been subsumed by fiscal policy, and that 
budgetary considerations became paramount in the development 
and evaluation of policy, as compared with other values, 
such as resource redistribution, access to services, and 
equity. (Block et al. (1987) critique the "realist" view of 
social welfare spending held by many conservatives; the 
realist view provides some of the ideological support for 
this fiscalization of social policy, and blames social 
welfare programs for the nation's fiscal problems.)
The organization of certain sectors further contributed 
to this policy situation, and is described in the 
organizational environment literature, in particular by 
Scott and Meyer (1983). They point out that "within public 
sectors in the United States, funding decisions are more 
highly centralized than are programmatic decisions" (144).
At the same time, "the medical care and educational sectors 
provide good examples of institutional sectors that are 
characterized by high levels of fragmentation" (145). And, 
they point out, "when funding is centralized, but 
programmatic authority is not, control is exercised by
financial officers and accountants" (145).
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PROPOSAL SUBMISSION
In the Fall of 1983, the proposal for school mental 
health services was submitted to the Budget Office. There 
followed several months of negotiation, mostly between the 
Mental Hygiene Department and the Budget Office. The Budget 
Office staff's interest in the proposal stemmed solely from 
their view that the program had the potential to reduce 
special education expenses. Cost-savings would result if 
children in special education could be removed from special 
education and returned to the regular classroom, where they 
would then receive specialized services through the on-site 
school mental health program. Thus, the Budget Office did 
not approve the proposal as submitted, but requested that 
the program be geared toward removing children from special 
education.
The text of the Fiscal Year 1984 City Executive Budget 
(New York City, Office of Management and Budget, 1984), 
which was prepared in the Spring of 1983 (before the Budget 
Office had seen the on-site school mental health program 
proposal), discussed cost-saving efforts to control the 
Special Education budget, including "mainstreaming" students 
in special education into regular education. At that time, 
the special education budget was over one half billion 
dollars, and serving over 110,000 students; this growth
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represented a 2.5 times increase since 1978. Every three 
years, children in special education received what is called 
a "triennial evaluation" to assess their need for continued 
special education services. The budget officials saw this 
triennial review as an opportunity to "decertify" some 
special education students. They hoped that these 
decertified students would then be placed in regular 
education classes, and provided, at the same time, with the 
mental health services of the on-site program. Since 
special education cost approximately $8,000 per pupil, as 
compared with $3,000 for regular education (New York City, 
Office of Operations, 1981), substantial savings would be 
realized through this strategy.
This goal, however, of decertifying special education 
students, was not the goal of the program, as stated in the 
proposal submitted to the Budget Office. Rather, the goal 
of the program's planners had been to make services 
accessible to all schoolchildren with emotional problems, 
although within this group, there certainly would have been 
children who would have been diverted from special 
education.
In addition to the fact that the on-site program had 
been planned with a very different set of goals, the Mental 
Hygiene Department was not at all anxious to become involved 
with the special education system for the following reasons, 
as well:
—  It had been the problems of accountability and 
monitoring in the Division of Special Education 
which had prompted efforts to move mental health 
funding out of the Public Schools in the first 
place.
—  The special education system was operating 
under intensive federal court scrutiny, including 
monitoring by a Federal judge, as the result of 
litigation against the Public Schools from various 
plaintiffs. Naturally, the Mental Hygiene 
Department and its contract agencies were not 
anxious to become linked to this system, and to 
face possible legal scrutiny, as well.
—  It was by no means certain that the triennial 
review process would yield referrals for the 
program. Very few children, proportionally, were 
decertified from special education annually, and 
it was not known how many could be decertified 
even if mental health services were made 
available.
—  Even if a triennial evaluation showed that a 
child could be decertified, parents could block 
such a move, which happened often. The 
conventional wisdom offered by educators about why 
parents often prefer their children to remain in 
special education classes is that because the size
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of those classes is much smaller than the size of 
regular education classes, students often receive 
greater individual attention in special education 
classes, and can be perceived as being higher 
achievers. If the students are returned to larger 
regular education classes, parents fear that their 
children will achieve less and receive an 
insufficient amount of attention, while, at the 
same time, be stigmatized for having once been in 
special education classes.
—  The Mental Hygiene Department feared that the 
SBSTs, who performed the triennial evaluations, 
might not wish to cooperate with mental health 
agency staff. This was a concern since, as 
mentioned before, some members of the SBSTs had 
stated that they were just as qualified to do the 
work of the mental health agency staff, and that 
they saw no reason why they shouldn't, in fact, be 
doing it.
The compromise reached at that time, concerning the 
issue of mainstreaming special education students was that 
the Mental Hygiene Department, which was taking the leading 
role in negotiating with the Budget Office, agreed to revise 
the proposal, incorporating the goal of removing children 
from special education, which was stated by the Budget 
Office. It did not however, agree to gear the program
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totally toward removing children from special education.
It is ironic that a program proposal which had as a 
major impetus the removal of the delivery of mental health 
services in the schools from under the special education 
aegis should be viewed fiscally as a potential solution to 
special education budget problems. This resulted from the 
combination of the fragmentation of authority and decision­
making (Edwards, 1980; Scott and Meyer, 1983), and the 
separation of programmatic and fiscal authority in municipal 
government, with the Budget Office exercising great 
influence. That is, although the Mental Hygiene Department 
and the Public Schools had, with some difficulty, agreed to 
implement a mental health program in the schools with 
specific programmatic objectives, the Budget Office, through 
its fiscal authority, was able to change the orientation of 
the program's stated goals. However, when viewed in the 
context of the overall relationship between the Budget 
Office and the Public Schools, as described above, this is 
not altogether surprising. The Budget Office could use its 
influence on this program to exercise control that it 
normally did not have over the Public Schools, especially 
over Special Education. In view of the relatively small 
amount of City money (out of the $4.5 million, half was City 
funds) actually involved in the proposed transfer of the 
school mental health funds from the Division of Special 
Education to mental health agencies, one is tempted to look
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for a potential symbolic role for the Budget Office's 
scrutiny of this proposal. Considering the history of 
contention between the Budget Office and the Public Schools, 
it may be that this provided the Budget Office staff with 
the sense that they were exercising greater control over the 
Public Schools' budget.
As discussed at the beginning of the chapter, the 
Budget Office's actions are an example of what Selznick 
(1966) calls "informal cooptation" (14). Selznick then goes 
on to make the distinction between the "substance of power," 
(14) in this instance assumed by the Budget Office, and 
"formal authority," (15) which was maintained by the lead 
agencies. As he puts it, "an open acknowledgement of 
capitulation to specific interests may itself undermine the 
sense of legitimacy of the formal authority in the 
community" (15). Thus, for the Mental Hygiene Department, 
especially, which had placed great significance on this 
initiative, it was important for its legitimacy that the 
final program bear some resemblance to the proposed program. 
Its constituency, which included the mental health agencies 
and advocacy groups, had made the program a focus of 
attention, and had lobbied hard for the program. Thus, if 
the outcome of the negotiations with the Budget Office had 
been entirely unsuccessful, the credibility of the Mental 
Hygiene Department might have come into question.
A countervailing force which provided impetus for
maintaining as much of the program's original design and 
intent as possible was the input of the children's mental 
health advocates, (which included representatives of the 
community mental health agencies). These advocates of 
children's mental health services wrote letters to the 
Mayor's Office, the Budget Office, and local political 
figures. It is quite likely, too, that some of the more 
influential members of the advocacy community may also have 
had informal discussions, behind the scenes, with City 
officials. Some may also have been prepared to put pressure 
on the Mayor, if necessary, by pointing out that it was 
during meetings of the Task Force on Youth Services (which 
he had established) that the Mental Hygiene Department and 
Public Schools had first agreed to bring mental health 
services into the schools.
PROPOSAL REVISIONS AGAIN
The Mental Hygiene Department then went ahead and 
revised the proposal, maintaining elements of the original 
program design, while addressing the Budget Office's 
concerns. The Mental Hygiene Department argued that by 
making mental health services available to all school 
children, placements to special education could be 
prevented. However, the Budget Office was not usually very 
receptive to arguments for preventive services of any sort; 
the Budget Office tended to believe that it was not possible
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to demonstrate conclusively that any problem had ever been 
"prevented," and, thus, that savings could be realized.
Also, the Budget Office staff expressed the concern that the 
program would end up resulting in identifying large numbers 
of children for whom additional services would be required, 
thus further escalating costs. Also, the Budget Office was 
concerned that, since the Public Schools did not have data 
on the number of children referred to special education as 
the result of emotional problems (as opposed to learning 
disabilities, physical problems, etc.), it was not a simple 
matter to estimate the potential impact of the program.
In order to help bolster its case for the program, the 
Mental Hygiene Department tried to use data on the special 
education system to help estimate the potential impact of a 
prevention-oriented program. However, because of the above- 
mentioned lack of data and the fact that the process for 
referral and placement into special education involved 
several steps, it was really impossible to trace the 
relationship between an initial decision to refer a child 
for an assessment and the ultimate placement decision.
(Since the Public Schools was an educational system and not 
a health system, its method of classifying problems was not 
comparable with the mental health system's, and it was 
difficult to estimate the current or future demand from the 
special education population for the specific services to be 
offered by the proposed mental health program.)
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Thus, a study was undertaken by the Mental Hygiene 
Department to demonstrate to the Budget Office that the 
children whom the agencies were planning to serve in the on­
site program would, indeed, have as serious emotional 
problems as those children who were being placed in special 
education. The Budget Office wanted to be assured that the 
program would, in fact, be treating children who would 
otherwise be placed in special education. The staff at the 
Budget Office still felt very strongly that the on-site 
program should have a large impact on reducing special 
education costs.
The informal study was carried out by reviewing the 
clinical records of a random sample of one hundred school 
children receiving mental health services through a program 
run by Brookdale Hospital CMHC in District 23 in Brooklyn. 
The program was similar to the one proposed by the Mental 
Hygiene Department, and had, in many ways, served as a model 
for it. It had been operating since the mid 1970s through a 
local agreement between the community school board and the 
CMHC.
The study collected data about diagnoses and reasons 
for referral to the program, gleaned from medical charts. 
This data was reviewed by the Mental Hygiene Department's 
Special Assistant to the Commissioner for Children's 
Services, who was a child psychiatrist. In his opinion, the 
profiles of these children reflected a level of disability
so severe that it was almost impossible for such children to 
function in a regular classroom. While it is difficult to 
determine the impact of specific individual factors on 
complex policy and program decisions, the results of this 
study, informal as it was, may have been fairly influential. 
First of all, it was quantitative, which appealed to the 
Budget Office staff, who were themselves quantitatively 
oriented. Second, the Budget Office was not likely to 
challenge the clinical judgment of the City's Mental Hygiene 
Commissioner, Sara L. Kellermann, M.D., a psychiatrist, 
further supported by a child psychiatrist. (If the Budget 
Office had challenged the clinical determinations, it would 
have had to get its own outside clinical consultant. This 
would have been perceived as a serious incursion into Dr. 
Kellermann's domain, and the issue would have been brought 
to the First Deputy Mayor or Mayor for resolution. As much 
power as the Budget Office had, it is unlikely that a 
confrontation on this issue would have been to its benefit.)
Meetings between the staff of the Budget Office 
and the staff of the Mental Hygiene Department continued 
throughout the fall of 1983, and into the winter of 1984. 
Information was exchanged, data was analyzed, and the 
program model was continually revised. These revisions 
involved mostly reworking the numbers of children to be 
served and the impact on special education. Since there was 
very little hard data, much of this was quite speculative,
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involving various assumptions about preventing special 
education placement. The Department staff became focused on 
getting approval to establish programs in the schools, no 
matter what. While the Budget Office did make requirements 
and modifications which seemed unreasonable and unrealistic 
to the Department staff (such as numerical commitments about 
the number of children to be removed from special 
education), that did not deter the Department from its goal. 
It was, of course, frustrating for Mental Hygiene Department 
staff to constantly have to revise the proposal in order to 
project potential cost savings. The staff were anxious to 
implement the program rather than to keep performing what 
seemed to them unnecessary and rather speculative exercises.
Among those of us who were actively working on this 
effort, there was a certain frustration and cynicism, as 
well as excitement, as we attempted to fashion arguments 
that would convince the Budget officials. The Mental 
Hygiene Department was very eager to begin implementing the 
program, while the Budget Office was very determined to be 
assured, before implementation began, that the program would 
help reduce special education costs. In addition to many 
meetings and written exchanges at all levels, there was a 
lobbying effort by child mental health services advocates to 
pressure the Budget Office, and, ultimately, the Mayor's 
office, to approve the program.
Independently, there were meetings between Public
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School officials and the Budget Office about the overall 
Public School budget, as well as about the particular 
concerns over special education. Although many school 
officials expressed skepticism to the Budget Office about 
the program being able to remove children from special 
education (because of the administrative and legal barriers 
to decertification), there was some affirmation about the 
preventive elements of the program.
This process illustrates what is so often noted about 
attempts to make changes in large systems, which is that 
change tends to be slow and incremental. Relatively 
ambitious plans for change face opposition, cooptation, 
fiscal realities, slow-moving regulatory processes and other 
decision-making processes, as well.
DECISION POINT THREE: THE CITY'S BUDGET OFFICE AGREES
TO THE PROGRAM
In early 1984, after many meetings and exchanges of 
memoranda, agreement on a proposal was reached between the 
Budget Office, the Mental Hygiene Department, and the Public 
Schools. The new proposal stated that the program would 
serve two groups of children: children who might otherwise 
be placed in special education as the result of an emotional 
problem; and children who could be decertified from special 
education. The first group of children were to be referred 
to the program by teachers and guidance counselors, and a
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system for making these referrals was to be worked out. It 
was intended that the second group of children, those 
already in special education, would be considered for the 
program during the triennial review of their special 
education placement. In addition, if more frequent reviews 
of special education status took place, that would provide 
an opportunity, as well, for school personnel to consult 
with the mental health agency staff to determine if 
supportive mental health services provided to the child 
would allow the child to be decertified from special 
education and placed in a regular classroom. Then, the 
mental health agency staff would provide services to the 
child.
The program was to be implemented in 15 districts; the 
Mental Hygiene Department would contract with community 
mental health agencies to provide the services. Further 
reflecting the program's special education focus, the 
administrative responsibility for the program within the 
Public Schools was switched from the Office of Pupil 
Personnel Services to the Division of Special Education. 
Although this switch occurred at a time when the Pupil 
Personnel Office was, in fact, being reorganized, I believe 
that the switch really had to do with the enormous pressure 
the Public Schools continued to be under to reduce the size 
and expense of special education.
As part of the agreement, the Budget Office requested
that the program be formally evaluated during the first year 
of operation to measure if the program was achieving the 
goal that the Budget Office had set for it, namely that of 
reducing referrals to special education. After further 
discussions, funds for such an evaluation were made 
available by the Budget Office. Then the Public School and 
Mental Hygiene Department staff began meeting to discuss 
terms for an evaluation, including who would carry it out 
and what its scope would be, as will be discussed in the 
next chapter.
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VII. OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTATION:
COMPETING ISSUES AND INTERESTS
The approval of the program by the Budget Office 
provided a cause for celebration within the Mental Hygiene 
Department, and also among the children's mental health 
services advocates who for so long had been trying to get 
mental health services funding for school based-programs.
In fact, however, there was very little time for 
celebration, since there still were so many details to be 
worked out on the Citywide level.
At the same time, the Mental Hygiene Department needed 
to begin dealing with the operational-level, day-to-day 
details of the program, which would concern all of the 
schools and mental health agencies that would be involved in 
implementing the program. During the period when all 
efforts had been directed toward getting the program 
approved, such details as the precise mechanism for children 
to be referred to the program, had not been a focus. 
Suddenly, there was a whole new set of complex issues to 
attend to before the program could be fully implemented.
As a result of these new considerations, the number of
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organizations with an active interest in the program had 
increased. Naturally, these new stakeholders did not all 
see things the same way, and the issues raised by the 
ensuing conflicts also added a level of complexity to the 
entire effort.
Finally, further adding to the complexities was the 
fact that new staff members within the two lead agencies —  
the Mental Hygiene Department and the Public Schools —  were 
now going to become involved. Initially, a small cadre of 
staff within the Mental Hygiene Department, and a few staff 
of the Public School's Office of Pupil Personnel Services, 
had worked on the original program proposal and the 
revisions of that proposal. However, at this stage of the 
game, as the program was going to be introduced to 
individual districts and mental health agencies, a new level 
of staff within both systems was about to become involved.
In the Public Schools, this included Regional staff, who had 
responsibilities for several districts (as part of the 
special education system), and district and school-level 
staff. Within the mental health system, the staff with 
Citywide responsibilities were joined by Mental Hygiene 
Department borough office staff, as well as by 
representatives of the mental health services agencies which 
would be serving the districts.
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BACKGROUND
Ironically, after what had seemed to the Mental Hygiene 
Department staff to be an eternity of waiting for approval 
by the Budget Office (which finally came in February 1984), 
the Budget Office began exerting pressure on the Mental 
Hygiene Department and the Public Schools to have some of 
the schools and agencies begin their individual programs 
before the end of the 1983-84 school year, even though there 
were many details of the program design and its 
implementation still to be worked out. And these details 
were no small things; they included the selection of 
agencies and schools, the drawing up and negotiating of 
contracts with the agencies, the subsequent hiring of staff 
by the agencies, and the establishment of policies and 
procedures to govern the program's operation in the schools, 
(including determining how to secure Medicaid funding for 
the services).
However, to the Budget Office staff, the fact that the 
program had been approved meant that certain service and 
financial commitments regarding the program's impact on the 
special education budget had been incorporated into the 
City's 1983-1984 Financial Plan, and thus, there was no time 
to lose in meeting those commitments. The Budget Office 
staff had no patience for the views of program planners 
about the need for attention to the details of the process 
of program implementation. Berman states (1978): "The
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article of faith that unites implementation analysts is a 
belief that the carrying out of a policy, the installation 
of a technology, the realization of a plan, or the 
enforcement of a law is neither automatic nor assured"
(160). Clearly, the Budget Office staff were not 
"implementation analysts."
The ability of the Budget Office to exert this 
influence is another manifestation of the "fiscalization of 
social policy." Within City government, the influence of the 
Budget Office made it difficult for the leadership of 
agencies like the Mental Hygiene Department to raise program 
implementation concerns, because the raising of these issues 
likely would have resulted in the Budget Office saying that 
the agencies did not know how to run programs, and then 
challenging their legitimacy.
This chapter will further explore the effort to get the 
program off the ground —  or, in Berman's terms —  to move 
from macro- to micro-implementation (Berman, 1983); that is, 
from a focus on "high-level management decisions" to a focus 
on "the delivery or technical task" (164). And, this move 
was occurring amidst what was still a great deal of 
uncertainty regarding how the program would operate, 
including the following: the details of the contracts 
between the Mental Hygiene Department and each community 
mental health agency selected for the program; the 
establishment of policies and procedures for operating the
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program; the evaluation of the program, including some 
events which take us further ahead chronologically than the 
rest of the chapter, but which belong, structurally, in this 
chapter; and, perhaps most crucially, the involvement, which 
was unanticipated, of the United Federation of Teachers (the 
teachers union), in decisions about the program's design and 
implementation.
MENTAL HEALTH AGENCY SELECTION
In order to solicit agencies to participate in the 
program, the Mental Hygiene Department circulated a Request 
for Information (RFI) to all State-licensed mental health 
agencies in New York City, including both those that 
received funding from the Mental Hygiene Department and 
those that did not. The public mental health system in New 
York City consists of over 100 agencies throughout the City, 
as well as State and municipal (Health and Hospitals 
Corporation) facilities. Within each borough, the Mental 
Hygiene Department has a manager and staff who are 
responsible for overseeing the service system in that 
borough. The manager is familiar with all the agencies in 
that borough and, through a variety of planning and 
informational committees which meet on a regular basis, is 
well-known to the agency directors and senior staff. Also, 
the Mental Hygiene Department staff perform site visits to 
audit the programs. Thus, these RFI forms were intended to 
supplement an already rich formal and informal knowledge
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base. In these forms the Mental Hygiene Department 
requested information about the agencies, including a brief 
description of their current programs for children, prior 
experience working with schools, and the location and 
service area of the agencies. Most of the responses came 
from agencies well-known to the Department, since these 
agencies already had contracts with the Department to 
support other mental health programs.
Once the RFI responses were received, the agencies that 
responded were matched with the school districts that had 
been identified as priorities for the program, based upon 
the Public Schools' criterion of numbers of requests for 
assistance for SBST services. In many cases, there was only 
one agency appropriate for the district, based on location 
and service area. In those districts in which more than one 
agency was available, the individual agency's experience 
with schools, and its fiscal, administrative, and clinical 
performances were considered, before a decision was made.
While the Mental Hygiene Department was making these 
decisions about the agencies, there were, however, (as will 
be discussed below in greater detail) changes being made in 
the selection of which school districts the program would 
serve. Since one of the criteria for the agencies was that 
they be able to serve specific areas of the city, changes in 
the district selections had an impact on the choice of 
agencies. Thus, during this period of Spring 1984, there
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was intense activity, as well as a feeling of uncertainty, 
as Department staff were trying to work out choices of 
agencies, and also to get contract documents written, 
approved, and forwarded to the Board of Estimate for 
approval. The Department staff wanted the programs to start 
as soon as possible; and, at the same time, they were trying 
to adjust to the changes in districts being made as the 
result of simultaneous discussions with Public School 
officials, representatives of the Teacher's Union, and the 
Mayor's Office of Youth Services.
In order to contract with voluntary non-profit agencies 
and hospitals, the Mental Hygiene Department had to bring 
the proposed contracts before the City's Board of Estimate. 
The Board of Estimate met monthly, and contract documents 
were to be submitted to the Board of Estimate membership 
sufficiently prior to the meeting to allow time for review. 
The Board consisted of the Mayor, Comptroller, City Council 
President, and the five borough presidents, all elected 
officials. Prior to submission to the Board, the contracts 
had to be reviewed by the City's Budget Office, as well. 
Thus, it was clear to those involved that, from the time 
contract negotiations began, through contract preparation 
and the various approvals necessary, several months would 
have to pass.
The proposed contracts between the Mental Hygiene 
Department and the agencies required that the agencies
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specify in detail the anticipated costs of providing 
services. The contracts also required that the agencies 
make specific projections of how much service would be 
provided, as measured by the total numbers of visits. These 
projections were to be made annually, as well as broken down 
on a monthly basis. And, while various guidelines were made 
up regarding these projections, sufficient differences 
existed among the agencies, themselves, as well as among the 
programs they operated, to make each contract unique. (As 
part of its negotiation with the Budget Office, the Mental 
Hygiene Department already had projected the amount of 
service the program would provide; this projection, however, 
had been worked out in the aggregate, for the program as a 
whole. In order to complete the contracts, projections had 
to be worked out for each agency. And these projections had 
to take into account differences in costs for each agency, 
reimbursement income, and other factors.)
To assist the agencies in contract preparation, and to 
attempt to standardize the program as much as possible, the 
Mental Hygiene Department developed a model for the agencies 
to use in staffing the program. A staffing pattern 
specifies the combination of staff of each mental health 
discipline required to provide a certain quantity of 
service, taking into consideration the type of setting the 
services are provided in, the types of clients, the goals of 
the program, etc. The staffing pattern was developed
keeping in mind the available funding, as well. In addition 
to providing a staffing model, the Department lowered its 
requirement for the number of direct treatment visits that 
each staff member had to perform, since it anticipated that 
starting up the program in the schools (which would require 
meetings with teachers, guidance counselors, parents, and 
other interested parties), would take up staff time that 
might otherwise have gone to actual direct service to the 
children. The Mental Hygiene Department wanted to be sure 
that staff had time to work with teachers and other school 
officials to develop referrals and to follow up on cases.
The reduced service commitment, however, affected the 
projection of revenues, which had an impact on the overall 
budget for the program. A change in any one assumption had 
a ripple effect, not just for the individual agency's 
contract in question, but for the entire program, since the 
total amount of funding available, citywide, was fixed. As 
discussed earlier, the Mental Hygiene Department and Public 
Schools had made certain commitments to the Budget Office 
about the overall impact of the program, as measured by the 
numbers of children served, and also by the numbers of 
children kept out of special education and/or removed from 
special education. The contracts required projections of 
this as well.
Also, the Mental Hygiene Department still was 
negotiating with the Budget Office as late as March 1984
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about the precise outcomes for the program. These 
negotiations concerned the number of children to be removed 
from the special education system and the number of children 
whose entrance into that system was to be prevented. These 
numerical targets had an impact both upon the contracts with 
community mental health agencies and upon the design of the 
evaluation of the overall program. The City's Executive
Budget for Fiscal Year 1985 (July 1, 1984-June 30, 1985), 
which was prepared in April 1984, makes reference to a 
savings of $4.5 million in the Board of Education budget, as 
well as to the budgeting of money for an outside evaluation 
(New York City, Office of Management and Budget, 1984: 192). 
In order to gain Budget Office approval, the Mental Hygiene 
Department developed projections of the impact of the 
program: "1,700 children will be mainstreamed (i.e. removed
from special education and placed in regular education) and 
referrals for evaluation will be reduced by 2,940 students" 
(192).
For the most part, the agencies accepted the model 
staffing pattern developed by the Mental Hygiene Department, 
and thus were willing to enter into contract. However, in 
one case, a municipal hospital that had been selected to 
participate in the program wanted to make a significant 
change in its staffing pattern. This change was to add a 
full-time administrator for the program, although such a 
position had not been included in the Department's model.
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In addition, the hospital wanted to include substantially 
more time of a psychiatrist than the staffing pattern 
anticipated. Psychiatrists were considerably more expensive 
than other mental health professionals. These two 
enhancements would increase the budget of the proposed 
program considerably, without any offsetting revenues; thus, 
the Mental Hygiene Department could not approve this, and so 
another agency had to be found in order to serve the 
district.
In order to begin to meet the targets set for the 
program, at the same time that the above mentioned 
negotiations were taking place, the Mental Hygiene 
Department and Public Schools were trying to get the program 
started in an initial group of five districts (referred to 
as the Phase One districts) by June 1984. By June 1984, the 
Five Phase One agencies had contracts which had been 
approved by the Board of Estimate, and the districts had 
identified schools for the program to begin. Since it would 
take some time for the agencies to get new staff hired for 
the program, program directors or other members of the 
agencies' senior clinical staff would begin working with 
school officials to set things up. By mid-July, seventeen 
agencies for fifteen districts (two districts were divided 
so that two agencies would serve them) had been identified, 
and nine contracts had been approved. Twelve 
superintendents had approved the program, and another three
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had given provisional approval, while they awaited community 
school board approval.
DEVELOPING POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
At the same time that these agencies were being 
selected, and at the same time that contract negotiations 
were beginning with the agencies that were to participate in 
Phase One, Public School and Mental Hygiene Department staff 
began meeting to discuss the program with a greater 
attention to detail. An initial meeting of high-level 
Mental Hygiene Department and Public School staff was held 
in February 1984. At that meeting, both the Division of 
Special Education and the Office of Pupil Personnel Services 
were represented, though this was the last time the Office 
of Pupil Personnel Services was to be involved.
Since the program had taken on a special education 
prevention focus, the leadership of the Public Schools had 
placed responsibility for the program within the Division of 
Special Education; this move by the leadership reinforced 
the direction in which the program's focus had been moving.
Also, as discussed earlier, the fact that the program was 
going in that direction —  which had not been the initial 
intent of either the Mental Hygiene Department or the Public 
Schools —  reflected the desire of the Budget Office to find 
less expensive alternatives to growing special education 
system. And, as mentioned earlier, Special Education is a
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heavily regulated area. There had been court cases brought 
against the Public Schools regarding access to services. 
Thus, now that the program had a focus on special education 
prevention, extra care needed to be taken so that the 
program not be viewed as preventing access to special 
education in those instances in which special education 
placement was, in fact, most appropriate for the children.
In April 1984, a meeting was held between Mental 
Hygiene Department staff and representatives of the Public 
Schools. One purpose of the meeting was for the Mental 
Hygiene Department staff to be introduced to the Division of 
Special Education's newly-selected liaison for the program, 
Irma Godlin, who was in charge of the Division's Office of 
Alternative Programs. This choice was consistent with the 
view by the Public Schools, and the Budget Office, that the 
program be a part of the overall effort to develop 
alternatives to special education. This view, although 
consistent with the expectations held by the Budget Office, 
was quite different from the initial conception of the 
program held by the Mental Hygiene Department, which had 
been to make mental health services more accessible to all 
schoolchildren. And, while the program still involved 
placing mental health workers in the schools (thus 
increasing accessibility for the children), it now seemed to 
the Mental Hygiene Department that the program's focus on 
preventing special education placement, on the one hand, and
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helping to remove children from special education, on the 
other, would leave many children whom the Mental Hygiene 
Department wanted to serve with no greater access to mental 
health services.
The Mental Hygiene Department did not want the program 
to become a part of the special education system. The 
original conception of the program was that it would be an 
extension of the community mental health agencies which 
could reach into the schools. However, once the Budget 
Office attached special education-related outcomes to the 
program's funding, and once the Division of Special 
Education became the program's sponsor within the Public 
Schools, this conception was held only by those within the 
mental health system. Yet, it had been problems between the 
Bureau of Child Guidance, the Division of Special 
Education's predecessor, and the Mental Hygiene Department, 
that had been a major catalyst for the program's 
development.
Thus, in order to counter the perception that the 
program was designed to provide counseling services in the 
schools merely as an alternative to special education, the 
Mental Hygiene Department began to emphasize to the Public 
Schools Central Office and school district personnel the 
fact that the programs in the schools would be linked to the 
larger agencies which sponsored them, and thus would be able 
to offer services not just to the children but also to other
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family members, including family therapy, if it would help 
address the problems of the children referred to the 
program. In addition, they emphasized that the agencies 
could provide comprehensive psychological and psychiatric 
services beyond what could be provided by either the SBSTs 
or the on-site programs alone.
Subsequent to the meeting at which the Public Schools' 
liaison was introduced, a Program Advisory Committee was 
formed, chaired by the Executive Director of the Division of 
Special Education, and including senior Mental Hygiene 
Department staff, the Public School program liaison, and a 
number of District and regional level administrators and 
supervisors in both the regular education and special 
education system. One of the purposes of this advisory 
committee was to provide advice on the best way to implement 
the program, reducing conflict and assuring appropriate 
referrals. In addition, the Program Advisory Committee 
provided information, based upon their experience, on the 
likelihood of the program being successfully established in 
the various school districts. This information was used in 
revising the list of selected districts.
PLANNING THE EVALUATION
The agreement with the Budget Office had included that 
a formal evaluation of the program be carried out. The 
intention of the evaluation would be to determine the
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program's effectiveness during its initial year. The 
continued funding of the program would hinge on the 
evaluation, which would seek to determine if the program was 
reducing referrals to special education. One hundred and 
twenty-five thousand dollars was made available for the 
evaluation by the Budget Office.
In the late Spring of 1984, the Public Schools staff 
proposed to the Mental Hygiene Department that the Office of 
Educational Evaluation, a quasi-independent unit within the 
Public Schools, administer the evaluation. This was 
acceptable to the Mental Hygiene Department. Then, the 
Office of Educational Evaluation was asked to prepare a 
preliminary evaluation plan, and a few meetings were held 
with the Director of that Office to discuss the evaluation.
The Office of Educational Evaluation shortly thereafter 
submitted its preliminary evaluation plan. Naturally, the 
plan proposed to determine if the program^ was having an 
impact on special education referrals. In addition, the 
evaluation would provide some descriptive information on the 
children receiving services. It would also describe the 
manner in which the program was functioning within the 
schools, so that future modifications could be made. And, 
finally, the plan proposed the evaluation of the behavioral 
and educational impacts of the program.
While the Office of Educational Evaluation was willing 
to evaluate the program, certain difficulties in evaluating
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the impact of the program on special education referrals 
began to be identified and discussed at these preliminary 
meetings. The problem had several dimensions:
—  The special education system was in flux.
There were changes being implemented in the 
classification system used in categorizing and 
placing children in specific programs. This would 
make it difficult, if not impossible, to compare 
one year's performance to the next.
—  In some areas there was a backlog in the 
referral process, so that if some children were, 
in fact, diverted, their places would have been 
taken up by other children. This would make it 
difficult if not impossible to show the impact of 
the program.
—  At the initial referral stage in special 
education, the referring teacher does not specify 
the type of service required by the child, since 
that is determined further along in the process by 
the Committees on the Handicapped. Since the on­
site school program could only be expected to 
reduce referrals for emotional problems, and not 
for other sorts of problems such as physical 
disabilities, hearing and speech difficulties, 
etc., there appeared to be no way to make a one- 
to-one comparison between the on-site program and
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the reduction in referrals.
However, the Mental Hygiene Department staff and the 
Public Schools staff felt that the Office of Educational 
Evaluation would be in the best position to devise solutions 
to these evaluation problems, since it was familiar with the 
various data bases in the schools and had experience with 
working on similar problems in other school evaluations.
The plan proposed by the Office of Educational 
Evaluation was then reviewed by the Budget Office and the 
Mayor's Office. While no one challenged the merits of the 
plan, it was decided by these staff that the evaluation 
results would never be accepted as independent and 
impartial, if the evaluation were carried out by the Office 
of Educational Evaluation, even though the office had 
evaluated highly visible and sensitive programs in the past. 
At that point, the Director of the Office of Educational 
Evaluation did agree to be a technical advisor to the staff 
who would have to develop a Request For Proposals (RFP) for 
an outside evaluator. A Steering Committee was formed, 
consisting of representatives of the Mental Hygiene 
Department, the Public Schools, the Budget Office, and the 
Mayor's Office of Youth Services. This group would be 
responsible for reviewing the proposals, choosing a 
contractor, and overseeing the conduct of the evaluation.
It was not until the early Spring of 1985 that an RFP 
was completed that was satisfactory to all parties. Some of
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the issues that arose in developing the RFP had to do with 
defining the scope of the evaluation, and being precise 
about what would be expected as far as data gathering, 
versus what could be provided to an evaluator in the form of 
already collected data. It was the staff of the Mental 
Hygiene Department and the Public Schools who wrote and 
rewrote the RFP. As they tried to make it as clear and 
precise as possible, a major difference in the views of the 
representatives of the two systems emerged. To put it 
somewhat more starkly than may be fair, the difference was 
that the education system is geared toward relatively short­
term behavioral changes. The mental health system, in 
general, is geared toward changes in internal emotional 
states, which would then drive behavioral changes. These 
happen relatively slowly. For teachers who want relief from 
children who often are disruptive, the prospect of referral 
to a mental health program which would not offer some short­
term results would be relatively unattractive. Also, basic 
educational indicators, such as reading and math scores were 
not likely to change significantly over the course of a 
single school year because a child was receiving an hour of 
psychotherapy a week.
Since the evaluation was not a research project, but 
rather a highly politicized evaluation, the Mental Hygiene 
Department staff were concerned that the variables to be 
measured, and the outcomes to be expected, be reasonable. On
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the other hand, neither party wanted to do the work of the 
evaluator, so the RFP was kept fairly brief and schematic, 
leaving it up to potential evaluators to propose strategies.
The Budget Office had hoped that the evaluation of the 
program would be completed in December 1985, so that the 
decision about continued funding for the program could be 
made in time for the 1985-1986 school year. However, with 
the delay in developing the RFP, it became clear that the 
evaluation would most likely not be completed until December 
1986. In the spring of 1985, the RFP was sent out to a list 
of twenty or so university and corporate evaluators; only 
two responses were received, perhaps because prospective 
evaluators were aware of both the difficulties in measuring 
what was expected to be measured, and the political context 
within which the evaluation would be conducted. After 
reviewing the proposals and meeting with the evaluators, the 
Steering Committee chose Dr. Sheldon Kastner of NYU to carry 
out the evaluation. By this time, the program had been in 
operation for more than an entire school year.
I have gotten way ahead chronologically in this story, 
but, from a structural point of view, the events described 
above fit into Stage Four. This disjuncture between strict 
chronology and the structure of events often occurring 
simultaneously reflects what I discussed in the first two 
chapters about things not necessarily being linear nor the
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structure a priori. We now return to the Spring of 1984.
THE UNION ENTERS
In New York City, the teacher's union —  the United 
Federation of Teachers (UFT) —  is an important and 
influential participant in educational politics. Although 
the UFT does not get involved in decision-making regarding 
every single program the Public Schools develops, once it 
appeared that the on-site school mental health program was 
going to be implemented, the union expressed its concerns 
about the program to the Public Schools' leadership. Its 
major concern was that the mental health agency staff coming 
into the schools would pose a threat to the jobs of school 
social workers and school psychologists. Further, the 
school social workers and school psychologists believed that 
they themselves could perform the work being asked of the 
mental health agencies, if they would be relieved of their 
responsibilities to assess children for special education 
placement. Thus, the union membership wanted the outside 
mental health staff eliminated and the money used to hire 
additional school social workers and psychologists.
A series of meetings was held with the Division of 
Special Education, the Mayor's office, the Mental Hygiene 
Department and the union leadership. The union's top 
leadership seemed to understand the value of the program and 
the additional resources which were being brought to bear on
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a serious problem, but wanted assurances that its members' 
jobs were not jeopardized. And, the union received 
agreement that its representatives could attend various 
district level meetings at which the program was presented, 
to assure that the interests of union members were 
protected. Once these assurances were provided, the union 
officials, did, in fact, provide information which was 
useful to the Public Schools' officials in selecting 
districts for the program. Among other things, this 
information included the union officials' perceptions about 
the likelihood of successfully implementing the program in 
various districts, and conversely, identifying some in 
which, as the result of an uncooperative or unreceptive 
superintendent or lack of guidance counselors, 
implementation would be difficult. This advice, was, in 
fact, heeded, and did result in four districts being dropped 
from the list of districts which had been created in 1983, 
and additional districts being added. The total of 
community school districts selected was now nineteen. In 
addition, the Public Schools requested that the Mental 
Hygiene Department contract with an agency to serve two high 
schools in Manhattan. The Mental Hygiene Department agreed 
to do this.
It should be noted that the Deputy Assistant 
Superintendents for Special Education were also brought into 
this decision-making process about the choice of districts.
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The DAS's, as they are referred, have Regional 
responsibilities for supervising special education within 
the Public School system. The regions correspond to 
Boroughs, except in the case of Brooklyn, in which one 
Region is part of Brooklyn and another is the balance of 
Brooklyn plus Staten Island.
Also, separate from the above meetings, the union 
received a promise from the Division of Special Education 
that the program would not be expanded beyond its originally 
planned numbers of schools and staff, at least until the 
program evaluation was completed. The Mental Hygiene 
Department was not a party to this agreement; this was to be 
a source of tension, periodically, since the Mental Hygiene 
Department and mental health advocates were to lobby to 
expand the program during subsequent years.
While the top union leadership agreed to support the 
program, the union chapter representing the school 
psychologists and social workers did continue to try to have 
the program stopped. An issue of the chapter newsletter ran 
an item stating that the chapter leadership was continuing 
to attempt to remove the mental health agency staff from the 
schools, and to have the funds returned to the Public School 
budget. School psychologists and social workers continued to 
perceive the program as an intrusion by outside mental 
health agency staff. Since the school psychologists and 
school social workers' salaries were paid by the Public
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Schools, from a budget which had grown over the years (in 
part as the result of the increase in special education), 
they were concerned that the Public Schools might try to 
replace them with the mental health agencies' staff, whose 
salaries were paid by the Mental Hygiene Department (and in 
part by medicaid and other insurance reimbursement).
Also, there was some resentment by the school 
psychologists and social workers against the mental health 
agency staff. Some of them stated that they viewed their 
own work (assessing children for placement in special 
education) as less professionally satisfying and interesting 
than providing ongoing clinical treatment to children.
DECISION POINT FOUR: CONCERNS RAISED BY THE TEACHER"S
UNION ARE SUCCESSFULLY ADDRESSED
As the result of the agreement by the Teacher's Union 
to support the program's implementation in exchange for 
involvement in decision-making about the program's 
development, the program planners could begin to contact 
school superintendents about the superintendents' interest 
in the program.
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VIII. SELLING THE PROGRAM TO SCHOOL SUPERINTENDENTS 
BACKGROUND
For the program to be implemented, individual school 
districts had to agree to participate in the program. As 
discussed previously, a list of potential districts had been 
drawn up, based upon the criterion of numbers of requests 
for assistance from teachers and guidance counselors to 
SBSTs during a six month period. These requests were taken 
as an indication of a need for mental health services. 
Subsequently, changes to that list had been made, based upon 
input from the Union and from the Deputy Assistant 
Superintendents for Special Education, who had borough-wide 
responsibility for special education services. This input 
included assessments of the anticipated reception the 
program would receive from the superintendents, the 
sufficiency of guidance counselors in districts, and an 
assessment of the ability of the Superintendents to manage 
the program and to work cooperatively with Central Public 
Schools officials, mental health agencies and other 
interested parties.
Until this point, all of the meetings and other
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discussions between the Mental Hygiene Department and the 
Public Schools had involved the Central Office and these few 
Borough-level personnel. Individual district officials had 
not participated in the planning of the program, nor had 
they been contacted about their interest in the program, at 
least not formally. (It is likely that there may have been 
informal discussions within the Public Schools with District 
Superintendents regarding the intent to implement the 
program).
In this stage in the program's development, a 
significant change in the path from plan to program outcome 
occurred. As discussed earlier, in his discussion, Berman 
(1978) distinguishes between macro-implementation and micro­
implementation. While there is no precise point at which 
things move from macro to micro implementation, certainly at 
this point micro-implementation is underway. In the present 
case this is highlighted by two related factors: changes and 
an increase in the number of settings in which program 
activities occurred, as activity within the separate school 
districts and communities began in earnest. What had been 
conceptualized as one, single program, was now becoming five 
programs, one for each of the initial five school districts. 
And it would then become fifteen programs for the three 
schools apiece in those districts. And then it would become 
an increasing number —  approaching seventy —  as districts, 
and schools within these districts, become the sites of
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activity. Also, at the same time, the number of interested 
parties became enormous, and, as will be discussed in the 
next chapter, implementation involved an increasing number 
of issues (many unanticipated) with unforeseen problems 
arising.
Berman states that "the literature agrees that the 
implemented program [what Berman calls the missing link 
between policy and outcome] depends on the complex interplay 
between the policy choice [i.e. the policy itself] and the 
policy’s institutional setting, which consists of one and 
often many formal and informal organizations" (164). Berman 
adds, "the faithful execution of government programs 
typically requires changes in the standard operating 
procedures that define delivery organizations. Such change 
never comes easily. Indeed, organizational members may 
adapt to demands for change in unanticipated ways, which is 
the crux of the micro-implementation problem" (172). The 
unpredictability suggested in the above quote was 
exacerbated in establishing the on-site school mental health 
program for two reasons: first, two different systems were 
involved, and, second, although the program was being 
coordinated at one level it was being implemented at another 
level (the local level) in a number of different sites, and 
by a number of different organizations. There were both 
vertical and horizontal connections that had to be made, and 
translations between systems.
Also, because of the prior history behind the 
program's development, there were old rivalries between 
members of the two systems, as well as different goals 
implicit in the implementation. The school personnel who 
were approached about implementing the program, for 
instance, were only familiar with the final program that had 
been approved by the Budget Office (and then subsequently 
made even more specific in written materials developed by 
the staff of the Public Schools and Mental Hygiene 
Department). On the other hand, many of the leadership and 
staff of the children's mental health agencies, as well as 
the Mental Hygiene Department staff, still carried with them 
the memory of the earlier program plans, which had had 
nothing to do with reducing costs for special education. 
Added to these different goals was the fact that the 
conditions in each district, school, and mental health 
agency would be different enough to make it impossible to 
implement the programs as carbon copies of each other 
(Lipsky, 1980; Berman, 1978).
In each district, and in each school, the program model 
and the resources being offered were interpreted by 
superintendents according to the current district politics, 
their view of the schools' needs, and their prior 
experiences with mental health services, among other things. 
Thus, regardless of the central office staffs' intentions to 
manage the program on a citywide basis, each district and
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school had, to some extent, a distinct and separate program. 
And, each mental health agency also had its particular view 
on things, reflecting different structures, size, 
orientation, and other factors.
PHASE ONE DISTRICTS
Soon after the approval of the program was received 
from the Budget Office, five district superintendents —  one 
from each borough —  were approached about their potential 
interest in having the program in their district. Then, a 
presentation was scheduled at which both Public School and 
Mental Hygiene Department staff introduced the proposed 
program to the superintendents. Naturally, after these 
presentations had been made, the district superintendents 
raised their own specific concerns about program 
implementation and policy. These ranged from concerns about 
finding appropriate space for the program, to skepticism 
about whether the program would be successful in helping to 
remove children from special education. The superintendents 
also raised questions about the process by which children 
were referred to the program, and whether parents would 
consent to having their children receive mental health 
services in the schools.
For the most part, the choices of districts and mental 
health agencies for Phase One of the program, were 
unproblematic. In one case, however, there was a problem.
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The superintendent of one district in the Bronx rejected the 
choice of mental health agency, indicating that another 
agency was preferred. The rejection of the agency created a 
bit of a crisis, and brought to a head issues of program 
control, because, in its haste to move ahead in Phase One, 
the Mental Hygiene Department already had completed a 
contract with the agency it had chosen. A compromise had to 
be reached, therefore, and so the originally-chosen agency 
agreed to serve some schools in part of an adjacent 
district. (And the program was not established in the 
district that had rejected the agency.)
MEETING WITH SUPERINTENDENTS
It was planned that the remainder of the fifteen 
district programs would start during the following school 
year, beginning in September 1984. But it was not until the 
Spring of 1985 that the program was fully implemented. By 
that time, nineteen community school districts and two high 
schools were being served by twenty-two mental health 
agencies. Of the original fifteen districts, five were not 
included in the nineteen which were ultimately to 
participate in the program; of the final nineteen, nine had 
not been in the original list. The meetings with the school 
superintendents (during which the initial presentations were 
made) had provided the first opportunity to bring the 
program from being a well-elaborated idea to being poised
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for implementation. While up to this point the locus of the 
program planner's activities centered around the City Hall 
area of lower Manhattan and the Public Schools central 
offices on Livingston Street in Brooklyn, now the "orbit" 
extended to school district offices in five boroughs.
The typical initial meeting with the District 
Superintendent occurred at the School District office, 
either in the Superintendent's office or in a conference 
room. Most often the District Offices were in schools, or 
in buildings adjacent to schools. The meetings were usually 
attended by some members of the superintendent's staff, and 
the director of guidance services. Also, representatives of 
the school social worker and school psychologist chapter of 
the Union attended, as had been agreed to at meetings 
mentioned in the previous chapter. If, by that point, the 
mental health agency to provide services had been selected, 
it often had a representative in attendance. Also, in 
addition to the Mental Hygiene Department planner who had 
made the presentation about the program in conjunction with 
the Public School liaison, staff from the Borough Office of 
the Mental Hygiene Department was included. In general, it 
became clear during these initial meetings that the 
Superintendents were pleased that additional mental health 
resources were being made available for children in their 
district. They recognized the need for mental health 
services for school children, and many of the
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Superintendents expressed strong and enthusiastic interest 
in the program. They also appeared to recognize that 
implementation of the program would not be easy.
It was widely believed by the staff of the Mental 
Hygiene Department that the program would not have been 
accepted by the Superintendents and the principals without 
the efforts of the Director of the Division of Special 
Education's Office of Alternative Programs, who was the 
liaison for the on-site program. Her ability to steer the 
implementation effort through some often tense and conflict­
laden meetings and incidents was unusual. She had an 
understanding of the mental health system, and such 
understanding had appeared to be missing in earlier contacts 
between Mental Hygiene Department staff and Public Schools 
staff. She also dealt very effectively with District 
officials, who at times felt that the program's 
implementation would be too much trouble, or would create 
friction, within the districts.
The circumstances in each district were different. 
Sometimes, for instance, there was a lack of space in the 
schools. Also, some schools lacked guidance counselors, 
and, this was viewed as a major problem since it was 
believed that their presence was essential. The program 
planners expected the guidance counselors to insure 
referrals to the program, as well as to provide a link 
between the teachers, school administrators, the special
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education system, and the mental health agencies. In 
districts where there were guidance counselors, the 
superintendents were concerned that often already 
beleaguered guidance counselors would perceive the program 
as an additional burden. Also, some superintendents were 
hesitant to commit to the program without community school 
board approval.
These and related concerns influenced the willingness 
of the superintendents to receive the program, as well as 
the selection of specific schools. The superintendents also 
selected schools based upon the following: the quality of 
individual school management; the need for services in the 
specific schools; the nature of the student bodies; and, the 
likely acceptance on the part of parents in each school.
Also, relations with the SBSTs was a critical issue.
The SBST school psychologists and school social workers were 
not part of the community school district hierarchy.
Rather, the Division of Special Education had its own 
structure, which divided the city into five regions, with a 
Deputy Assistant Superintendent in charge of each region.
The social workers and psychologists reported up through a 
structure that included clinical supervisors who oversaw the 
work of these professionals. On the other hand, within each 
district there was a Committee on the Handicapped, which was 
the body that made the placement decisions into special 
education (based upon the information provided by SBST
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evaluations). In some districts, good management, mutual 
respect, and informal professional and personal relations 
contributed to relatively smooth relations among all of 
these players. In other districts, it was reported that 
this was not the case.
After that initial meeting with the 
superintendents had been held, the Public School's liaison 
worked tirelessly to encourage the superintendents to accept 
the program and to begin selecting specific schools. 
Sometimes this required behind-the-scenes discussions so 
that assurances could be provided to equivocal 
superintendents that the program would definitely receive 
enough resources to operate, and that it would not become an 
administrative or political headache for them.
In addition to their joint effort to recruit school 
district superintendents to select schools to participate in 
the program, the planners were working together on other 
aspects of the program, such as designing and getting 
approval for printed forms for use in the program. Also, as 
planning started in each district, different sorts of issues 
arose, such as who would be responsible for telephone- 
related expenses, and assuring that locks would be placed on 
the doors of rooms where mental health agency staff would 
work. Because of the different organizational perspectives 
that the staff brought to their work together, there were 
some differences of opinion concerning the degree and type
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of flexibility which could be incorporated into the 
program's design, and how much local discretion could be 
exercised by the various parties in attempting to solve 
problems, and to adapt the plan to unigue conditions and 
requests in the districts.
As the program moved closer to becoming a reality, the 
differences between the two systems —  education and mental 
health care —  became even more relevant. Both the 
community mental health agency staff and the Mental Hygiene 
Department staff were unfamiliar with the inner workings of 
the schools and the "world view" of those inside.
Similarly, the mental health system was unfamiliar to the 
Public School personnel. The two systems operate under very 
different models —  health care and education —  and the 
structure and culture of the systems are very different.
For example, in terms of structure, the Public School 
system encompasses a vast system of schools, districts, and 
Central Office bureaus, units and Divisions, under a single 
Board of Education. Within that system, the Central Office 
has certain responsibilities and authority, while other 
rights and responsibilities are held by the districts and 
the schools. But all ultimately are part of the single 
system.
On the other hand, the mental health system consists of 
relatively autonomous mental health agencies and even more 
autonomous hospitals, with specific, and well defined,
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contractual obligations to the Mental Hygiene Department.
But these obligations do not in any case encompass the full 
scope of the agencies' responsibilities. They all have 
their own boards of directors, and they tend to have contact 
with lots of outside organizations, including other city and 
State agencies, each other, and their professional 
organizations. Their nomenclature, ideologies of treatment, 
etc. are different than those of the school personnel.
Also, what Meyer (1986) says regarding the mental 
health system in general is true in New York City regarding 
organizational forces at work within the mental health 
system. He writes that "the system lacks integration and 
structure. This is apparent on both classic dimensions of 
structure in an organizational system. Vertical 
differentiation is unclear, with anarchic networks of 
partial control or sovereignty. Horizontal differentiation 
is also unclear, with any given organizational unit handling 
multiple problems, and any given mental health problem being 
dealt with simultaneously by many different and unintegrated 
organizations" (25).
In terms of culture, many of the Public Schools 
employees have been in the system for a long while, and have 
moved among the various units, adopting a shared 
organizational "world view." They take for granted the 
model of authority and the division of responsibility, and 
expect those they come into contact with outside the system
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to know it too. In general, they do not have a great deal 
of contact, on a professional level, with outside 
organizations. The system is relatively monolithic and all- 
encompassing. Nevertheless, significant tensions do exist 
within the system. In particular, there are tensions 
between the community school districts and the Central 
Offices. For example, some of the cynicism expressed 
initially by the superintendents about the program, was 
because they perceived it as something cooked up in the 
Central Offices, without their input, that they would then 
have to make work.
It is more difficult to characterize the mental health 
system's culture, since the system is more differentiated, 
with different types of organizations and settings, ranging 
from small, community-based agencies, to departments of 
psychiatry in large medical centers. Also, various 
professional disciplines are represented, including 
psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, and counselors 
of various types, all of whom have different treatment 
ideologies. Also, services are delivered in private, under 
norms of confidentiality and with the pressures, often, of 
societal stigma. Further, individual professionals in the 
system may move from one agency to another throughout their 
careers. Also, practitioners may move into policy and 
program development positions in either City and State 
government, and vice versa. As Meyer (1986) writes about
the mental health system, "the different organizations 
reflect different collectivities, professions, ideologies, 
definitions of the problems, technologies, and funding 
systems" (25). And he continues, "the system reflects 
continual and direct crises of legitimacy. It is highly 
funded but left open in every respect to fundamental 
cultural attacks" (27). While in New York City mental 
health services possess greater legitimacy perhaps than 
elsewhere in the nation, mental health services are not 
taken-for-granted and normative, like school services, for 
which, on the other hand, according to Meyer, "there is a 
national institutionalized definition of education, broadly 
shared and used in every arena, from which school 
organizations can draw clarity, support and legitimacy"
(27) .
The Division of Special Education liaison who had been 
given responsibility for coordinating the program's 
implementation was then assigned to implement the program. 
She had had no particular involvement with, or interest in, 
the earlier conception of the program that the Mental 
Hygiene Department had held (establishing mental health 
clinics in schools to serve any, and every, child who might 
be in need of mental health services). This earlier, and 
broader, conception, of course, was at variance with the 
specific focus the program had taken on as the result of the 
agreement with the Budget Office.
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One of the concerns the liaison voiced was that, in her 
view, while the program provided additional resources to the 
mental health agencies, the schools were being given no 
additional resources to support the administrative bv.rdens 
the program placed on them. Thus, she was protective of the 
school staff.
Also, in the same vein, since the programs were to be 
located in school buildings, the liaison promoted the view 
that the programs be seen as "part of the school.11 She 
expressed the view that the schools were the "hosts" of the 
programs, and believed that the agencies should adapt fully 
to school norms. Her perspective was that teachers would be 
more likely to refer some children with problems to the 
program, rather than just to special education (as was most 
often the case) if the mental health staff were viewed as 
part of the school. Thus, the message from the Public 
School liaison, and from others within the schools, as well, 
was that mental health agency personnel were to consider 
themselves as school personnel and, therefore, to 
acknowledge both formal and informal authority structures 
within the schools. This would sometimes create a dilemma 
for the mental health agency workers, who viewed themselves 
as independent and autonomous workers providing the schools 
with their psychiatric expertise, and also with diagnostic 
and treatment services that would not be available to 
schools otherwise. And, therefore, they sometimes perceived
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the school personnel as inflexible. As it turned out, 
however, in many cases, as the programs were implemented, 
the mental health agency staff did find that they were able 
to be most effective by becoming identified as part of the 
school (albeit, with a special role to play). The 
independent evaluator of the program described this as 
"quasi integration" into the school.
DECISION POINT FIVE: SCHOOL DISTRICT SUPERINTENDENTS
ACCEPT THE PROGRAM
In each district, the superintendents made their 
decisions under different conditions, and with different 
priorities in mind. Decision Point Five is really the 
aggregation of the decisions made by nineteen school 
district superintendents, between Spring 1984 and mid-1985.
The fact that the superintendents agreed to participate 
in the program did not, by any means, eliminate the 
ambivalence that many had about the program. They 
expressed concern that the program would require a great 
deal of attention and commitment from guidance counselors, 
who were in short supply. Some of the superintendents did 
not wish to become involved in a program that would be so 
scrutinized by the Central Public Schools. They envisioned 
paperwork and other demands made upon them.
Also, some superintendents must have been concerned about 
the potential conflict with the SBSTs that could result from 
implementing the program. Nevertheless, there appeared to
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be a general consensus about the need for mental health 
services for children. Some of the superintendents and their 
staff had had positive relations with some of the mental 
health agencies, which contributed to their affirmative 
response.
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IX. MICRO-IMPLEMENTATION
In this chapter I will discuss the micro- 
implementation of the program, which involved establishing 
and maintaining the program in each of seventy schools. As 
discussed earlier, the concept of micro-implementation is 
borrowed from Berman (1978) who distinguishes between macro- 
and micro-implementation. While the overall Citywide 
planning of the program corresponds to macro-implementation, 
micro-implementation is a more local process, occurring in 
each district and school, leading to the establishment of 
the programs in each school.
Thus, Stage 6 —  micro-implementation —  unlike the 
preceding five stages, is not punctuated by a decision 
point. Rather, instead of a decision point, I discuss the 
transition toward the institutionalization of the on-site 
program, since, according to Berman (1978), 
institutionalization is the last phase of micro­
implementation (177). Institutionalization is often said to 
have occurred when a program's continuation is taken for 
granted by those responsible for funding, operating and 
otherwise supporting it, or when a program becomes part of
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"standard operating procedure" (Berman, 1978). 
Institutionalization frequently results in the practices 
associated with a once new or innovative program being 
absorbed into the overall functioning of the sponsoring 
organization. In this type of situation, while the discrete 
program may lose its identity, the practices associated with 
it endure.
BACKGROUND
The fact that micro-implementation was occurring in 
each school did not mean that macro-implementation ceased. 
While micro-implementation went forward, there continued to 
be ongoing discussions at the Citywide level about the 
following: overall management of the program; the continued
funding of the program; the evaluation, which had bearing on 
the continued funding; and, other issues. Issues 
overlapped, and often the line between program planning, 
macro-implementation, and micro-implementation was difficult 
to draw (see, for example, Pressman and Wildavsky (1983) for 
an extended discussion of the notion of the overlap of 
planning and implementation). Palumbo (1985) has made the 
observation that, "program implementation and program design 
are highly interrelated activities" (10). Certainly this 
was true in regard to the on-site program, in which planning 
and macro-implementation continued well after micro­
implementation had begun, since so many unforeseen issues
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had to be addressed.
A great many adaptations and adjustments had to be made 
in order for the micro-implementation process to be 
successful. As discussed in previous chapters, the staff of 
the Mental Hygiene Department and its agencies, and the 
staff of the Public Schools, had to learn to adapt and 
adjust to one another as part of macro-implementation.
Also, there needed to be mutual adaptation between the 
overseers of the program (the Mental Hygiene Department and 
the Public Schools) and the individual schools and agencies 
participating in the program. The Mental Hygiene Department 
and the Public Schools wished to maintain an over-arching 
identity for the program for reasons of accountability and 
prestige. On the other hand, they did recognize that, in 
order for the program to be effective, it had to be adapted 
to local realities. Of course, the staff of the Mental 
Hygiene Department and the staff of the Public Schools 
frequently perceived these local realities in different 
ways. Also, within both the Mental Hygiene Department and 
the Public Schools, staff frequently perceived these local 
realities differently. Naturally, as these various 
adaptations and adjustments were made, the course of micro­
implementation was affected.
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PROGRAM OPERATIONS
Operations Context:
The development of detailed guidelines on how to 
operate the program had been made complicated by several 
factors: the differences between the mental health system
and the educational system; the complexity of both systems; 
the fact that the program was being implemented in so many 
different school districts and schools, by so many different 
mental health agencies (Lipsky, 1976; 1980) ; and, the 
different expectations for the program held by various 
stakeholders, as well as their differing views about the 
importance of the program.
Especially at the beginning of the program's micro­
implementation, unanticipated problems and issues arose.
Each time a problem arose, the first decision that had to be 
made by those involved was whether the problem was something 
to be handled locally within the school, or whether it 
should be brought to the attention of the representatives of 
either the Public Schools or the Mental Hygiene Department.
The Staff in the Schools:
Before proceeding to discuss the specific micro­
implementation issues, some background on the types of 
individuals involved in the micro-implementation, as well as 
some background on their organizational and professional
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affiliations, may help to provide a context for greater 
understanding of the discussion. At the individual school 
level, each school had a school liaison, appointed by the 
principal. Often this was a guidance counselor, though in 
some cases it was an assistant principal. The school 
liaison's job was to represent the school in discussions 
with the mental health agency staff, and also with the 
district liaison (who had been appointed by the 
superintendent to coordinate the program district-wide). In 
addition, the school liaison represented the school in 
discussions with all other interested parties. The liaison 
also was involved in helping to set up and manage the 
school's referral process, and in helping to establish 
cooperative relations with the SBSTs, whose members 
evaluated children for special education, and the Committees 
on the Handicapped, which were responsible for making the 
determination of which special education program a child 
would be placed into.
The district liaison worked closely with the school 
liaisons in each school and also with the Public School's 
overall coordinator for the program, as well as with the 
staff person from the mental health agency who was in charge 
of the on-site program in the district. In addition, the 
district liaison worked with the Mental Hygiene Department's 
respective borough office in resolving problems with the 
mental health agency or in organizing borough-wide
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activities, such as training sessions for mental health 
agency staff and Public School staff.
Within the schools, the predominant mental health 
agency workers were social workers (M.S.W.s); there also 
were some psychologists, as well. Each agency also had at 
least one part-time psychiatrist assigned to the program, in 
order to supervise treatment and provide medically-oriented 
assessments. The mental health agencies had program 
directors who coordinated and managed the program across 
school sites; their responsibilities included providing 
clinical and administrative supervision, working with the 
school and district liaisons to monitor program operations, 
and providing a link to the Mental Hygiene Department staff. 
All of these people contributed to the ongoing operation of 
the program, and their collective efforts represent both 
successes and problems of the program.
Entering the Schools:
Once the individual schools had been selected for the 
program, mental health agency staff needed to be given a 
place to work inside the schools. Finding an unoccupied 
office in many of the City's schools for full-time use was 
difficult, because in many areas the schools were 
overcrowded. Most often, an office or classroom might be 
found on a part-time basis. However, in some cases, mental 
health agency staff worked in storage areas, closets or
other spaces not intended for providing services of any sort 
to children. Sometimes these spaces were not entirely 
satisfactory because, in addition to safety and comfort, the 
mental health agency staff wanted to be able to insure 
privacy for the children (and their parent or guardian) 
during treatment sessions. Thus, mental health agency staff 
wanted to be sure the door of the room locked securely, 
which was not always an easy thing to obtain. Also, if 
mental health agency staff kept records or other materials 
in the school for any length of time, they required a 
cabinet with doors that locked securely. These, too, were 
often a challenge to find in the sorts of spaces that were 
available; many of these rooms were small, and, most of the 
time, the space was shared. In selecting space for the 
program, principals were sensitive to the fact that many 
educational programs did not have adequate space. The 
principals did not want to create a morale problem with 
educational staff by giving the mental health program staff 
space that would be coveted by the staff of educational 
programs. In order to address all this, there was quite a 
bit of shuffling of space in the schools.
Once space was identified, it was not always easy for 
the mental health agency staff to obtain maintenance and 
custodial services in the schools; there was some conflict 
about who should pay for repairs and for additional locks, 
and similar items. The Mental Hygiene Department and the
contract agencies felt that, within the school buildings, 
the school system should absorb minor costs associated with 
establishing the program. They felt that this was 
appropriate for two reasons: each school had a custodial 
staff; and, within the school building the principal was 
responsible for all that went on in their schools, 
regardless of whether school employees were involved. (A 
few years later, there was widespread political and media 
attention in New York City to the "discovery" that 
principals did not, in fact control the custodians, as the 
result of various contractual arrangements.) The Public 
Schools, however, did not want to assume any additional 
expenses for the program. The Public Schools staff believed 
that, since the funds for the program had been moved to the 
Mental Hygiene Department's budget, the Mental Hygiene 
Department should pay for everything, even though space- 
related expenses within the schools had never been 
anticipated nor budgeted.
Even when appropriate space was found, the mental 
health staff felt they needed certain things, like 
telephones, which were not routinely available throughout a 
school. Again, it had been assumed by the Mental Hygiene 
Department that the mental health agency staff in the 
schools would have access to telephones. However, many of 
the agencies quickly discovered that many of the principals 
could not provide spaces with phones in them. Therefore, the
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agencies had to arrange for telephones themselves, bearing 
all the costs. After some discussions between agencies and 
the Mental Hygiene Department, these costs were able to be 
applied to the contracts, but the contract funding was not 
limitless, and the danger existed that too many of these 
unanticipated administrative costs would exhaust the funds 
available for the program.
Once space was identified by the principal, the mental 
health agency staff expected to be able to begin to work 
immediately. These individuals did not view themselves as 
school employees, and did not expect to have to adhere to 
the timekeeping, security, and public health requirements 
for school employees. They did not want to be held to the 
same regimen as the teachers and other school staff.
However, when the mental health agency staff began to show 
up in the schools, most of the principals insisted that the 
mental health staff follow the same procedures as the 
teachers, including sign-in or punch-in for daily 
attendance.
Also, school officials insisted that the mental health 
agency staff receive fingerprint checks and TB tests before 
they did any work in the schools. This requirement had not 
been previously discussed, nor had it been anticipated by 
the Mental Hygiene department. This issue was brought up 
only in the midst of micro-implementation, as staff were set 
to begin working in specific schools. The mental health
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agencies were not pleased about the fingerprint checks and 
TB tests, since they had their own personnel policies. They 
viewed this as an incursion by the Public Schools on their 
authority. The schools, however, were insistent. Also, 
there was concern about who would pay for the TB tests and 
fingerprint checks, since the Public Schools normally 
charged prospective employees for these tests. The Mental 
Hygiene Department found itself, in the interest of the 
program's continued implementation, having to approve this 
as an allowable expense in its contracts with the agencies, 
though the expense had not been budgeted initially. Once 
this was resolved, the mental health agency staff traveled 
to Public Schools headquarters, where the Personnel Office 
administered the fingerprint checks and TB tests.
Professional Relations:
As noted earlier, the school principals, administrative 
staff, and guidance counselors brought different 
expectations to the micro-implementation of the program than 
did the mental health agency staff. These differing 
expectations reflected a number of things, including the 
following: the history of the program's development, which 
meant different things to individuals in the two systems; 
the structure and culture of the two systems; the different 
roles the representatives of the two systems had vis-a-vis 
the program; and, the differing expectations held by the
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representatives of the two systems for the outcomes of the 
program.
Hall (1986) has made the point that what may appear to 
be inter-organizational conflicts (having to do with the 
organizations' operating philosophies or power) are really 
interprofessional conflicts, due to differences in the views 
of occupations or professions which, in this instance, deal 
with children. In settings where more than one profession 
operate together, "order and dominance must be negotiated" 
(152). He also points out that professionals attempt to 
differentiate themselves from each other in order to 
establish professional identity and to assert professional 
power. In the case of the micro-implementation of the on­
site program, the mental health staff encountered teachers 
who had different ideas about how the schoolchildren should 
be treated from the ideas of the mental health staff. 
Teachers also had different ideas about how treatment should 
affect children participating in the program. In general, 
teachers were concerned about immediately reducing the 
incidence of disruptive behaviors by students in their 
classroom, and assuring that emotional problems were not 
interfering with educational performance. On the other 
hand, the mental health agency staff viewed disruptive 
behaviors as symptoms of underlying problems, including 
family problems and more serious mental illness, and 
approached treatment with a longer perspective in terms of
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results. Many of the workers in the mental health agencies 
also had private therapy practices, and many of them had a 
psychodynamic (if not psychoanalytic) orientation, which 
looks beyond observable behavior to underlying motivations 
and to exploring unconscious factors. Therefore, treatment 
tended not to result in immediate reduction of negative 
behaviors, much to the chagrin of teachers.
While the distinction between the inter-organizational 
and interprofessional is useful, it can be very difficult to 
differentiate the inter-organizational from the 
interprofessional in a specific setting, because these 
factors interact. For example, teachers had found referral 
to special education an expedient route to remove children 
who were highly disruptive from their classrooms. If a 
teacher were to choose, instead, to make a referral of such 
a child to the on-site program, and the child was accepted, 
then the teacher would be agreeing to keep the child in the 
classroom, while the mental health workers attempted to 
address the underlying problems at the root of the child's 
disruptive behaviors. A substantial amount of time might 
pass before there was any significant change in the child's 
behavior in the classroom. Thus, the choice of whether to 
refer children to special education or to the on-site 
program could cause a conflict for the teacher. Therefore, 
in order to address teachers' conflicts about referral to 
the on-site program, the staff of the on-site program took
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several actions, including the following: the mental health
staff made efforts to educate and inform the teachers about 
mental health treatment; the mental health staff began 
setting shorter-term, more behavior-oriented goals in their 
treatment with the children; and, in some schools, a 
committee (consisting of guidance counselors and other 
staff) was formed to make decisions about referrals, so that 
teachers no longer had to make those decisions.
As mentioned before, the principals and other school 
personnel believed that the on-site program would function 
best if the mental health agency staff became part of the 
school. For the mental health staff, this would involve de­
emphasizing their own professional identities as social 
workers, psychologists or psychiatrists. To a certain 
extent, though, the integration of the mental health staff 
into the schools was consistent with the community mental 
health philosophy. The community mental health movement, 
begun in the 1960s, encouraged mental health services 
agencies "to reach out to children in their normal family 
and neighborhood setting and to provide innovative 
approaches for both the coordination and integration ... [of 
services]" (Wagenfeld and Jacobs, 1982: 60). So, some of 
the mental health staff did endeavor to develop informal 
relations with teachers and guidance counselors. In 
addition, nearly all of the mental health staff began to eat 
in the school cafeteria, spend time in the teacher's lounge,
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and chat with teachers in the school hallways between school 
periods. Some of the mental health professionals, however, 
were not comfortable with this integration into the schools; 
these individuals felt strongly that their distinct 
professional identities should be emphasized, and that part 
of the rationale for the program was that expertise and 
services not traditionally available in the schools was 
being made available. (Meanwhile, some of the mental health 
staff had been requested to provide consultation and 
training to teachers about classroom management, child 
abuse, drug abuse and similar issues. Although this was 
viewed as a service by the school staff, in some cases, it 
reinforced for the mental health staff that they should be 
viewed as expert consultants to the schools.) These mental 
health staff who wanted to keep their professional 
identities as distinct and separate were viewed as elitist 
by the school staff. Naturally, both the Mental Hygiene 
Department program managers and the Public School liaison 
were concerned that this divisiveness over the day-to-day 
role of the mental health workers in the schools would 
undermine their efforts to encourage referrals to the on­
site program. As a result, they held joint training and 
information sessions to provide opportunities for the 
teachers and mental health professionals to become more 
familiar with one another's values and viewpoints, and to 
attempt to foster mutual respect.
Both informally and formally, some of the teachers and 
guidance counselors said they feltf discouraged from making 
referrals because some of the mental health staff did not 
provide feedback about the children after referrals were 
made to the mental health staff. (The teachers and guidance 
counselors also said that this lack of feedback contributed 
to their feeling that mental health agency staff were 
frequently arrogant and elitist.) Since these teachers were 
making referrals based upon problems which manifested 
themselves in the classroom —  usually in the form of 
disruptive behavior —  they wanted immediate relief. When 
this was not forthcoming (when the behaviors did not change 
quickly), they felt entitled to hear from the mental health 
agency staff what was going on and what to expect. Some of 
the mental health agency staff, however, concerned about 
protecting confidentiality, were reticent about saying 
anything too specific about the children to the teachers.
The Mental Hygiene Department staff, however, believed that 
the teachers had a legitimate need to receive ongoing 
information about the referred children, and so they 
encouraged the mental health agency staff to provide more 
feedback. The Mental Hygiene Department staff believed that 
such feedback could be provided without violating the 
regulations regarding confidentiality. Over time, many of 
the mental health agency staff did develop communication 
strategies which seemed to address the teachers' concerns
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for information, while leaving the mental health staff 
feeling that they were still safeguarding confidentiality. 
For example, in some districts, the mental health agency 
staff set up group meetings with teachers, during which they 
discussed, in a general way, the progress of cases. These 
discussions provided the teachers with a sense about what to 
expect regarding changes in the children's behavior, as well 
as a better understanding of what occurred during the 
children's treatment sessions. (At the same time, as 
mentioned earlier, the mental health staff in some of the 
programs decided to set short-term, behaviorally-oriented 
goals for the treatment, which were consistent with the 
school staffs' expectations.)
The way in which these program adaptations unfolded 
varied from school to school, although the Mental Hygiene 
Department staff and Public Schools liaison did try to 
encourage these efforts at mutual adaptation across the 
board. However, much of the micro-implementation depended 
on personal relations, timing, and serendipitous occurrences 
(Lipsky, 1980) . (Also, because of the turnover of school 
and mental health staff, as well as the turnover of 
children, a great deal of the orientation and developmental 
work had to be repeated at least annually. While I have no 
systematic data on this, the fact that need for ongoing 
orientations kept being brought up in a large variety of 
settings and forums, over the years, makes me believe that
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the extent to which they actually occurred in each school or 
district had an enormous impact on the success of the 
program.)
The orientations that were held consisted of training 
sessions, which were then followed by meetings within the 
boroughs, to create a bond among the participants from the 
mental health agencies and schools, and to provide an 
opportunity for in-service training and professional 
exchange. These events were unique, especially for the 
school staff involved, since, as mentioned earlier, the 
school system has been, traditionally, quite insular, and 
the school day schedule does not provide much flexibility 
for such activities. The fact that the program did provide 
an opportunity for school and district liaisons to 
participate in these special events with their own 
colleagues (as well as with the mental health staff) may 
have contributed to the school staff's feelings of being 
invested in the program.
In addition, among the mental health agencies, there 
were periodic meetings arranged by the respective Mental 
Hygiene Department borough offices to provide an opportunity 
for information-sharing and problem-solving. These meetings 
fostered an esprit de corps among the agencies, and may have 
been helpful in alleviating some of the isolation that the 
staff felt at first while working in the schools, before 
they had developed relationships with school liaisons and
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other staff.
Naturally, in addition to the above-mentioned organized 
events, other things also contributed to the successful 
micro-implementation of the program at the local level. 
Sometimes, a serendipitous event or a personal relationship 
that had developed among staff members went far toward 
breaking down institutional or professional barriers. The 
following is a dramatic example of breaking barriers; it 
also serves as an example of the independence and discretion 
that can be exercised by staff working in schools, in spite 
of the regimentation of many aspects of school life (Lipsky, 
1980). Very early in the establishment of one of the Phase 
One programs, when the mental health agency staff were just 
getting set up in the school, a crisis occurred. A child 
had come to school distraught, depressed, and frightened, as 
the result of some family problems. Although the guidelines 
for the program require a fairly formal referral process 
(described in the next section), the principal asked the 
social worker to speak with the child on the spot, in order 
to help resolve the situation. The social worker agreed, 
and, in fact, took command of the situation, proceeding to 
intervene with the child. Subsequently, the social worker 
met with one of the child's parents, who came to the school. 
Through these efforts, the child's crisis was resolved, and 
the principal made it clear that he was delighted that the 
mental health agency staffperson had been available and
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responsive. From then on, the staff were viewed as an 
integral part of that school, and their services were always 
well-regarded there.
Referrals:
Prior to the program receiving final approval from the 
Budget Office in February 1984, staff from the two lead 
agencies had begun meeting to develop policies and 
procedures to govern the program. A major issue which 
surfaced at these meetings was what criteria would be used 
to select children for referral to the program. To address 
this issue, a fairly detailed checklist was developed, which 
listed behaviors and symptoms which teachers might observe 
in children having emotional problems. However, after this 
checklist was reviewed by the Public Schools staff, it was 
rejected as being too detailed and clinical in approach. 
Then, as a compromise, after several discussions among the 
planners, a form requesting a brief narrative description of 
the reason for referral was developed and adopted for use. 
The mental health agency staff, did, however, request that a 
companion form also be developed, which would allow them to 
request additional information from the teachers, once a 
referral had been made. After some back and forth about the 
specific information to be requested, such a form was 
devised. It took a great deal of time and effort to develop 
and finalize these two forms, as well as others that were
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developed. This was because the central office program 
staff of both lead agencies, as well as the legal office 
staff of both agencies, had to review them. Also, many of 
the forms were reviewed by individuals in the school 
districts and community mental health agencies, to ascertain 
if they would be both practical and useful. This all added 
to the time it took to establish the program in the schools.
Another major issue in terms of the referral of 
children concerned the referral process itself, which turned 
out to be rather complicated. First, the school personnel 
would not pass along any information about the children to 
the mental health agency without the consent of parents. As 
a result, parents were asked to come into the school to 
provide written consent, as required by law. As the program 
developed, it was the guidance counselors, in most 
instances, who met with parents and explained the program 
and the nature of the consent for referral and assessment. 
Thus, first the referrals went from the teacher to the 
guidance counselor, not to the mental health staff (as the 
mental health staff had originally assumed would be the 
case). The guidance counselors then reviewed the referral 
form. Sometimes, the guidance counselor would decide that 
the child should not, after all, be sent to the mental 
health staff but rather to the School Based Support Team for 
evaluation to determine whether special education was 
required, or to some other program which might be available
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in the school. And, sometimes, the guidance counselor would 
decide that no outside program was needed by the child at 
all; in such an instance, the guidance counselor might 
discuss alternative classroom management strategies with the 
teacher, or other ways to address the problems. Of course, 
in many instances, the guidance counselor did, in fact, send 
the referred child to mental health staff of the on-site 
program.
Over time, some districts and schools formalized this 
referral process. By formalizing the process, some of the 
districts also broadened participation; on a regular basis, 
in these districts and schools, representatives of all the 
various programs in the school which received referrals from 
teachers and guidance counselors would meet to discuss the 
referrals. (These other programs included remedial education 
programs and other counseling programs.) At these 
meetings, participants would determine, on a preliminary 
basis, the most appropriate program for the child. In 
addition to this being an efficient way to match up children 
with the most appropriate program, it also helped the on­
site school mental health program to become an integral part 
of the school. The adoption of this coordinated referral 
process tended to occur in those schools in which the school 
administration had consistently been most receptive to the 
program. This referral process further cemented the link 
between the mental health agency staff and school staff.
In those cases where parental consent for referral and 
assessment was obtained, the child was then referred to the 
mental health staff for an interview (called a "screening 
and assessment"). At this point, the mental health agency 
staff also might ask for additional information about the 
child from parents or school personnel. If the mental 
health staff believed that mental health treatment was 
appropriate, the mental health agency was itself required by 
State Mental Hygiene Law to get written consent from a 
parent to treat the child. At first, this required that the 
parent return to school once again. Some referrals only got 
this far, since it sometimes was difficult to get parents to 
return to the school a second time. As time went on, mental 
health staff and school staff coordinated this process so 
that parents could provide both consents at one time. This 
usually entailed the parent having a meeting with 
representatives of the mental health agency at the same 
time, or immediately following, the meeting with the 
guidance counselor.
Payment:
The issue of payment for the services highlights the 
differences between the mental health and education systems. 
The public mental health system, as previously discussed, is 
supported by a combination of the following: Medicaid and
other third-party insurance; patient fees which often are
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paid on a sliding fee scale; City and state tax dollars; 
and, contributions by the mental health agencies themselves. 
Although some kind of payment is always requested of 
patients by the public mental health system agencies, 
services are not denied if no payment is possible.
The first time a mental health agency described its 
payment policy to a school district superintendent, the 
superintendent indicated, categorically, that no parent 
could be requested to pay anything, since all services in 
public schools traditionally were free. This response 
surprised the representatives of the Mental Hygiene 
Department and the agencies, since the central office Public 
School staff had never indicated that the agencies would not 
be able to request Medicaid or other insurance information. 
In fact, one of the attractions of the program for the 
municipal government was that these other, non-City sources 
of support, existed.
After some discussion with school officials it was 
agreed that parents could be asked to provide insurance 
information, but that it would be made clear that services 
were available regardless of their having such coverage or 
their willingness to provide insurance information, and that 
no patient fees could be requested. This had to be well- 
documented by mental health agency staff, since the various 
insurers have strict guidelines about co-payments and co- 
insurance. On the other hand, since one of the purposes of
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the program was to reach children whose families would not 
generally seek needed treatment, it was important that there 
be no financial or administrative obstacles to their 
receiving services.
Mainstreaming:
Throughout the negotiations to establish the program 
there had been a great deal of skepticism expressed by both 
the Public Schools and the Mental Hygiene Department about 
the program's ability to remove children from special 
education. This was because very few children were 
decertified at all from special education, and because there 
were legal and administrative barriers to mental health 
agencies participating in the process of decertification. 
However, based on the commitments made to the Budget Office, 
the contracts that were negotiated with mental health 
agencies included funds for staff who were expected to work 
both with SBSTs and Committees on the Handicapped to 
identify those children who could be decertified from 
special education if mental health services could be 
provided to them.
The more, though, that was learned by the Mental 
Hygiene Department staff about the decertification process, 
the more difficult working with that process appeared to be. 
For instance, at least every three years —  hence the term 
"triennial review," —  children in special education were
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required to receive a formal review of their need for 
continued placement in special education from the Committee 
on the Handicapped. The rules governing special education 
included stipulations that outside consultants (which would 
include the mental health agency staff), could participate 
in this triennial review process only with the consent of 
parents and by invitation of the Committee on the 
Handicapped. Also, special education regulations required 
that decisions to decertify a child had to be made 
independent of the expectation that other specialized 
services would be available once the child was decertified. 
That is, unless the child could function in a regular 
classroom with no other help, the child was expected to be 
kept in special education.
The central office staff of both the Public Schools and 
the Mental Hygiene Department who were coordinating the on­
site program would have been pleased to have the 
mainstreaming component of the program eliminated, so that 
they could focus all efforts on reaching children before 
special education placement was necessary. However, the 
Budget Office staff insisted that the Mental Hygiene 
Department and the Public Schools find some way, despite the 
legal and administrative barriers, to make the mainstreaming 
component work, perhaps through an "informal arrangement," 
although this was viewed by Public School and Mental Hygiene 
Department staff as an uninformed suggestion, since special
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education was under extensive judicial scrutiny.
In a highly unusual move, to try to resolve this issue, 
the Deputy Director of the Budget Office agreed to meet with 
selected school district and mental health agency staff, as 
well as with Mental Hygiene Department staff and Public 
School staff, to discuss the obstacles to making the 
mainstreaming component work, as well as to receive 
information on the components of the program that were 
working. Even after this meeting, however, at which a 
litany of obstacles to the success of mainstreaming were 
presented, the Budget Office was not willing to remove this 
requirement for the program.
THE EVALUATION
As discussed earlier, the evaluation of the program did 
not get underway until the Fall of 1985. As previously 
discussed, the evaluation was being carried out by Dr. 
Sheldon Kastner, a professor of psychology at New York 
University. By the time the evaluation commenced, the 
program was fully operational in all but one of the chosen 
nineteen districts. An initial draft of the evaluation 
results was reviewed by staff of the Budget Office, the 
Public Schools, the Mental Hygiene Department, and the 
Mayor's Office of Youth Services in 1986. Then, some 
additional data from the 1985-1986 school year was made 
available, and the evaluator did further analyses at that
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time. Thus, it was not until 1986-1987 that a complete 
draft was shared with the steering committee. This draft 
was reviewed, and changes were requested by the steering 
committee. Further, there were meetings held to discuss the 
report and the implications of the findings, especially in 
regard to the program's effect on special education referral 
rates. (A final evaluation report was never made available, 
since the finding about the program's effect on reducing 
referral rates was so equivocal.) By that time, the program 
was well-situated in most of the districts, and yet, to the 
Budget Office, its future hinged completely on the impact of 
the program on reducing referral rates and accomplishing the 
mainstreaming of school children; in fact, in the absence of 
evaluation results during the previous year's Budget 
preparation, the Mental Hygiene Commissioner was called upon 
to defend continued funding for the program.
As mentioned, the evaluation had several components, 
including the following: a description of the 
characteristics of the children and the services they 
received; a measurement of the impact of the program on 
individual children; an assessment of whether the program 
was meeting the goal of reducing referrals to special 
education; and, a description of the way in which the 
programs functioned within the schools, with recommendations 
for future modifications of the program.
Initially, Dr. Kastner, the evaluator, had proposed
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observing a sample of children in the classroom on a pre- 
test/post-test basis, to determine if the services were 
having any impact on classroom behavior, which was often a 
reason for a referral. However, when he began to go about 
the process of implementing this (which included getting 
parental consent) there was an uproar from some parents who 
felt that this would violate the privacy of their children. 
The mental health agencies also contributed to this uproar, 
since (in addition to the privacy issue) they did not want 
parents to become discouraged about the program.
The findings of the evaluation (which looked at 1034 
participating students in fourteen districts), as reported 
in the most up-to-date draft report included the following:
—  The average age of the children was 9.9 years, with 
most (80%) of the children in grades one through five.
Two-thirds of the students were male. Data on 
race/ethnicity was not available to the evaluator.
—  Most of the children were receiving individual 
therapy, and many were also receiving family therapy.
In addition, other services of the mental health 
agencies were being used, including visits to 
psychiatrists.
—  The evaluator had developed a questionnaire to 
measure improvement in the children's behavior, as 
judged by both the teachers and the therapists. 
According to the findings, the therapists observed
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large improvement. The teachers, on the other hand, 
saw little or no improvement, with some indicating a 
worsening of troublesome behaviors.
—  When asked to appraise the program as a whole, the 
school liaisons and guidance counselors indicated that 
they were pleased with it, and wanted it to continue in 
the schools. They expressed the belief that the 
program made needed services available, including 
services to family members, whom school staff could not 
treat.
—  The evaluation was inconclusive on the issue of the
effect of the program on special education referral 
rates, as the result of the methodological and 
practical problems. The executive summary of the draft 
report indicated that "... the evaluation team 
questioned the utility of reduction of referral rate as 
an indication of the effectiveness of the program due 
to the small percentage of students referred to special 
education, and the very small decline in the referral 
rate that could be reasonably expected." By the time 
the evaluation results were made available to the 
steering committee (including the Budget Office) it was 
the 1986-1987 school year, and the program was well- 
established in most schools.
—  The evaluator recommended that greater communication 
between teachers and therapists be facilitated, and
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that more information about the program be made 
available within the schools. He also noted that some 
of the intended clinical effects would not likely be 
captured in such a short-term evaluation, and that, not 
surprisingly, further evaluation needed to be carried 
out.
THE FINAL PHASE: TOWARD INSTITUTION BUILDING 
The local implementation, or micro-implementation, of 
the program extended from Phase One, in May of 1984, through 
the 1984-85 school year, and into the 1985-86 year, since 
there were a few delays in identifying agencies and 
districts. Between July 1, 1984 and June 30, 1985, the 
program's initial school year, 1,877 referrals were made to 
the program. Of those referrals, 1,434 (76%) resulted in 
treatment services being provided for some period of time. 
During the following school year, by which time all but one 
of the district programs were fully operational, 
approximately 3,000 children were receiving ongoing 
services.
Once the program was in the schools, the balance of 
power between the Budget Office and the Mental Hygiene 
Department shifted, although the Budget Office continued to 
raise the possibility of eliminating the program during each 
year's budget preparation. Initially, the Budget Office did 
this because the evaluation had been delayed. Then, later,
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it did this based on the inconclusive evaluation results 
concerning the effect of the program on special education 
referral rates. However, the City's Mental Hygiene 
Commissioner, Dr. Sara L. Kellermann, was able to appeal to 
the Mayor's Office to preserve the program, based upon its 
successful implementation, and upon the program reviews 
carried out by the Mental Hygiene Department's Office of 
Program Review and Evaluation. This sometimes created 
conflict with the Division of Special Education, which was 
sensitive to the teachers union's concerns that, were the 
program to be expanded, it might result in some Union 
member's jobs being eliminated. For example, at the April 
1985 meeting of the American Orthopsychiatric Association, 
the Director of the Division of Special Education, Edward 
Sermier, was invited to speak about the program's 
implementation. In his remarks, he said:
...The next question is, are the right children 
being identified. I was over at the City Mayor's 
office about a week ago and the Department of 
Mental Health was trying to get this program 
expanded, and I said no way, until we have the 
outside evaluation. They said no, no, we have all 
the evaluation you need. We know we are serving 
the right kids, and they are emotionally troubled.
I said, hey wait a second, I can say the exact 
opposite because I'm at the Board of Ed. I said
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this is too important, I said you can't ask me to 
sit here with the information you have, given the 
vested interest that you have, and agree with you 
that you are serving all the right kids. I said I 
have an obligation to my own professionals out 
there and we agreed that we would have an outside 
evaluation before any expansion occurred...
(Sermier, 1985).
The program was not, in fact, expanded, but the program 
gained the support of most of the principals and 
superintendents in the participating districts. (In one 
district, however, the program was terminated, since the 
mental health agency was receiving very few referrals, and 
efforts to remedy the situation were not effective.) Also, 
interest in the program model was expressed by 
superintendents in other districts. This suggests that the 
program was popular within the school system, and had 
developed a positive reputation. By many indications, the 
program was becoming a fixture in those districts in which 
it had been implemented, and the process of 
institutionalization was occurring.
At the same time that the program was becoming 
institutionalized, there continued to be micro­
implementation issues that arose, that had an impact on the 
program's functioning. Each September, some Superintendents
made changes in their choice of schools. Also, there were 
changes in mental health agency staff, since many social 
workers and other mental health professionals found it 
difficult and unsatisfying to work in some of the schools, 
especially those in which space was poor or school staff 
were uncooperative or hostile. (Fortunately, over time, 
most school and agency staff developed good working 
relationships, and the programs began to be viewed as 
essential parts of the schools.) This helped the agencies 
hold on to staff for the program, although maintaining staff 
continued to be an issue for the agencies. Also, there was 
a great deal of turnover among teachers in the schools, so 
that each September the programs had to start over, to some 
extent, as far as orienting school staff.
Nevertheless, the program was becoming 
institutionalized. As time went on, the Budget Office 
concentrated less energy on the program, and the particular 
Budget Office officials who had resisted the program, and 
who had then continued to scrutinize it, had left the Budget 
Office, while the program persisted (Goodman and Dean Jr., 
1982: 229). By the time, in early 1990, that a Five Year 
celebration of the program was held (sponsored by the Mental 
Hygiene Department, the Public Schools, and the community 
mental health agencies) the new staff at the Budget Office 
did not give the program the attention that their 
predecessors had, and it appeared as though their priorities
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had changed.
CONCLUSION
In this study, I have described the planning and 
implementation of the on-site school mental health program, 
with particular concern for the organizational and political 
dimensions of program development and implementation. I 
have traced the development of the program, situating it in 
an organizational and historical context, and discussing the 
process through which program proposals were developed, 
written, and revised, as well as the process through which 
meetings and negotiations were held to plan various aspects 
of the program. Then, I looked at the manner in which, once 
the program had been approved, the process of implementing 
the program in the schools (micro-implementation) took 
place. This process led to a point at which mental health 
services were being provided to schoolchildren in each of 
the seventy individual schools participating in the program.
The study utilized several organizing principles.
First, six stages in the program's evolution —  from idea to 
implemented program —  were identified. These stages were 
marked by "decision points" corresponding to specific key 
events which were essential to the progress of planning and 
implementing the program. Over-arching the six stages was 
the use of Berman's distinction between macro- and micro-
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implementation, as the locus of activity and decision-making 
moved from the citywide level and the central offices of 
municipal government agencies (macro-implementation) to the 
individual school districts, schools and community mental 
health agencies (micro-implementation).
As part of the description and analysis of the 
program's evolution, attention was given to the following: 
the political context within which events were occurring; 
the organizational structure of the two main organizational 
players; and the inter-organizational relations among the 
participants. Also, as events proceeded, the number of 
participants increased. And, each of the participants had, 
to some extent, different concerns and perspectives. "And 
so it is in the world of organizations. The meaningfulness 
of any change may well vary with the perspective taken" 
(Woodman, 1989).
Two of the noteworthy characteristics of the planning 
and implementation of the program were the incremental 
nature of the process, and the numerous changes that were 
made during the process. These two characteristics reveal 
how, to some extent, program implementation is not a linear, 
predictable activity. At any number of points during the 
planning stage, for instance, the program could have taken a 
direction which would have resulted in a very differently- 
shaped program than the one which finally emerged, with 
different goals. If, for example, during the early stages,
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the experience of referring children from the SBSTs to the 
community agencies had been more successful (or, at least, 
had been viewed as more successful or desirable) it is 
conceivable that much of the energy that ultimately went 
into the on-site program might have gone into the 
enhancement of these referral procedures. Most likely, had 
that scenario occurred, the mental health agencies would 
never have been brought into the schools. Or, later, if the 
on-site program had not been tied to special education 
goals, both the program's implementation course and final 
design would have been different.
The study illustrates that individuals can make some 
difference even within large complex organizational 
settings, which often seem totally impersonal and immune to 
the effects of individual leaders. At several points 
throughout this program's development, the impact of 
individuals can be discerned. The two chief executives who 
were responsible for setting program development in motion, 
Chancellor Macchiarola and Commissioner Kellermann, deserve 
some credit for having overcome some of the unmitigated 
uncooperativeness that had existed between their two 
agencies. While the time may have been right for certain 
changes, and some of the impetus came from outside, the 
importance of the leadership they provided should not be 
lost.
The recognition of individual leadership can be easily
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lost because of the distance in time between the setting in 
motion of a program idea and its realization. And because 
of the difficulties and delays in implementing programs, 
they do not often meet the expectations made for them.
Claims made for proposed programs during the approval 
process are often exaggerated, in order to get them 
approved. This is understandable, since supporters of a 
particular program will try to present it in the best 
possible light, in order to compete for scarce resources. 
Implementation delays and the problems of delivering and 
evaluating services are down-played at this point. However, 
once program proposals are approved, they become the center 
of attention. By this time, the attention of the leaders 
has moved on to other priorities.
The behavior of the Budget Office officials 
illustrates, in part, the importance of individuals, 
particularly in the fact that it was their growing 
inattention to the program, in spite of the inconclusive 
evaluation, that allowed it to become institutionalized.
This was in contrast to their earlier stated position that 
the onus was on the program to prove itself. If public 
agencies functioned entirely bureaucratically, the program 
should have been eliminated.
The school mental health program was very much shaped 
by a variety of forces which affected it along the way from 
initial plan to implemented program. One such force was the
interorganizational politics of the two organizations. In 
order for treatment services to be provided to children, 
staff of the two organizations involved in planning and 
implementation had to be able to communicate as effectively 
as possible on all issues, such as how to select schools and 
mental health agencies, how to find space for the program, 
and how to structure the process of making referrals for 
children in need of services. Another powerful force which 
shaped the program was the influence of the Budget Office, 
whose expectations (as discussed) were at variance with the 
original conception of the program held by the Mental 
Hygiene Department and its contract agencies. The Budget 
Office's influence in changing the goals of the program 
(turning it into an alternative to special education) also 
shaped the implementation process, because it exacerbated 
the conflict between the mental health agency staff and the 
SBSTs. Although, once the program was established in the 
schools, the Budget Office's influence was diminished, and 
the program appeared to function much like it had initially 
been envisioned by the Mental Hygiene Department, though the 
link with the special education system continued to be a 
source of constraints and an invitation to scrutiny by the 
Budget Office and the teacher's union for several years.
Historically, neither organizational and inter­
professional context nor program implementation have been 
adequately attended to by policy makers and budget
officials. Therefore, although policy makers and budget 
officials may be anxious for program activities to commence, 
the actual implementers of the program may be grappling with 
unforeseen practical problems. In the case of the on-site 
school mental health program, the macro-implementation 
stages were taken up largely with fiscal issues and broad 
program design issues. It was only when the program plan had 
been approved by the Budget Office that attention was given 
to how the program would operate day-to-day. Thus, when the 
program plan was first presented to school and mental health 
agency personnel, there was a fair amount of criticism, as 
well as requests for modification. The school 
superintendents, in particular, complained that they had not 
been involved in the program's initial planning, and that 
too many practical issues had not been adequately dealt with 
by the program planners. However, the program planners, and 
the policy makers they worked for, continued to believe that 
progress would have been too slow if each step of the way 
they had brought the various practical issues to the 
superintendents and other individuals in the schools for 
review. They believed this to be especially true since 
macro-level agreement among the Mental Hygiene Department, 
the Public Schools, and the Budget Office had been so slow 
and difficult to achieve, in the first place.
While agreement at the macro-level between the Mental 
Hygiene Department and the Public Schools (followed by the
approval of the Budget Office) was a necessary condition of 
program development, much of the success of the program was 
due to the individuals within the schools and mental health 
agencies who operated the program on a day-to-day basis. 
These individuals were able to recognize their common goals, 
and to forge cooperative relations among themselves. They 
were able to create a network of mutual interest, which was 
supported by their knowledge that such networks were being 
forged in all the other schools that were implementing the 
program, as well, and that, even during times of crisis, 
there was a broad base of support for the program on all 
levels. While I was not in a position to systematically 
observe the individuals who operated the program, I do 
believe that they were instrumental to the program's staying 
power, and to its becoming institutionalized to the large 
extent that it did.
However, there continued to exist tension as a result 
of the conflict between the educator's desire for immediate 
behavioral change in the students and the mental health 
staff's approach which was based on the identification and 
treatment of underlying psychological factors which affected 
behavior and which changed relatively slowly, as well as 
their desire, in some cases, to treat the problems in the 
context of the entire family. This conflict is reflected in 
other ways. For example, while teachers use test scores, 
attendance, and behavior to measure educational outcomes,
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the mental health system often relies on evaluation of the 
organization of treatment as a proxy, since outcome 
measurement is not well-developed in clinical settings. 
Adherence to clinical standards, adequate treatment 
documentation, and other process factors are used to 
determine if good care is being provided. Of course, when 
behavioral change data is available to the therapist, it is 
utilized, but the subjective nature of much of clinical 
practice makes it difficult to systematically measure 
outcomes, especially in the typical community mental health 
setting, where resources for evaluation and research are 
lacking.
This study demonstrates the enormous energy, effort and 
attention to detail that was needed to sustain the 
implementation of the program. It also illustrates the 
intermingling of organizational, political, and professional 
issues in services delivery, and the ways these act as 
obstacles and constraints. It suggests that a number of 
major obstacles exist toward improving both the access and 
integration of mental health services for children, which 
are goals of many children's mental health services 
providers and advocates. Conversely, it also demonstrates 
that a network of committed individuals can successfully 
make changes and accomplish things within the City's 
education and mental health services systems, despite all of 
the political, fiscal and organizational constraints.
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The study illustrates the greater effort it takes to 
have an even marginal impact on the problems of childhood 
emotional problems. In the first chapter, I mentioned the 
fact that one reason the program was initiated was to 
address the gap between the estimated need of mental health 
services for 141,000 children and the served population of 
45,000 children. Once it reached its full capacity in the 
seventy schools in which it was located, the program could 
serve 5,000 children annually. These seventy schools 
represent less than ten percent of the public elementary and 
junior high schools in New York City. The 5,000 children 
is, however, ten times the number of children who had been 
referred to community mental health agencies by school 
staff, citywide, in 1981, prior to the on-site school mental 
health program.
While this study has been concerned with the planning 
and implementation of a mental health services program in 
the schools, it has relevance for other areas as well. For 
example, the phenomenon referred to in Chapter 6 above as 
"the fiscalization of social policy" affects more than just 
mental health and education, and has become more pervasive 
since the early 1980s, as part of the changes in social 
policy associated with the Reagan administration., While 
most students of public policy recognize, and almost take 
for granted, that budget officials will exercise great 
power, there exist few studies which look at this closely,
to explore its concrete results. Also, these days, many 
other areas of social welfare are facing the task of 
coordinating delivery of their services, and of developing 
joint programs (especially with the growing recognition that 
social and health problems interrelate). These agencies 
face planning and implementation problems not unlike those 
faced by the planners and implementors of the on-site school 
mental health program. Greater attention to the 
organizational, inter-professional and political contexts 
within which programs are developed would be extremely 
beneficial to both practitioners and researchers, and could 
help establish more effective and efficient programs.
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